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NEIGHBORS' RESISTANCE TO BLACK
ENTRY
LEONARD S. RUBINOWITZ" AND IMANI PERRY*
STEPHEN GRANT MEYER, AS LONG AS THEY DON'T
MOVE NEXT DOOR: SEGREGATION AND RACIAL
CONFLICT IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS (ROWMAN
& LITTLEFIELD, 2000) 343 PP.
Dr. Stephen Meyer has chronicled the history of white resis-
tance to housing integration during the first two-thirds of the
twentieth century. From the author's perspective, the book is
about housing discrimination and segregation-a conflict over
residential space that is contested along racial lines between
Blacks and whites. It is a story of Blacks seeking to gain access
to, and occupy, housing in neighborhoods whites considered to
be theirs, and whites' efforts to thwart, prevent, and deter those
efforts and to exclude and expel Blacks from those neighbor-
hoods. Meyer discusses discriminatory public and private insti-
tutional policies and practices; but his main focus is on "grass
roots" racist resistance-individuals acting separately or in
groups (sometimes very large ones) to exclude or expel Blacks
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from "their" neighborhood.' He argues that this resistance was
persistent and pervasive throughout the period he examines-
the first two-thirds of the twentieth centurym-and in all regions
of the country. In fact, during much of that time, racial conflict
and violence over housing were more common in the North
than in the South.2
While he discusses the numerous barriers to Black entry,
the most significant contribution to our understanding of this
history is his focus on post-entry expulsion tactics by whites, re-
flecting a widespread unwillingness of whites to have African-
Americans living in their midst. He focuses on deep-seated ra-
cial prejudice more than the role of racially discriminatory gov-
ernment and institutional policies and practices. 3  This racism
was reflected in the intimidation and violence used by whites
who "refuse to accept Blacks as neighbors."4
Meyer collects an eclectic nd extensive body of data-
accounts, statistics, and anecdote from a wide variety of places
that cover an extended period o time.5 In the aggregate, this
data presents a persistent and ervasive pattern-a dramatic
chapter in the story of America' -acial dilemma. In so doing,
he seeks to provide a corrective o previous accounts:
'While Meyer emphasizes private actions designed to expel Blacks, he also devotes
substantial time and attention to public and private policies and practices designed to
deny access in the first place. This essay will not address the latter aspect of the book,
except to the extent that criminal activity may be involved, such as public officials or
the police conspiring with private citizens to drive out a Black family.
Because of its focus on crime, this essay will not treat two other important issues
related to Blacks moving into white areas-the situations where some or all whites ac-
cepted, supported, or protected Black neighbors (or at least did not commit crimes
of resistance) and the movement by many whites out of such neighborhoods as Black
entered-the phenomenom often referred to as "white flight".
' See STEPHEN GRANT MEYER, As LONG As THEY DON'T MOVE NEXT DOOR:
SEGREGATION AND RACIAL CONFLcr IN AMERiCAN NEIGHBORHOODS 5 (2000).
' See id. at viii. Meyer argues that Charles Abrams understated the role of private
prejudice in his classic 1950s book Forbidden Neighbors. See CHARLES ABRAMS,
FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS: A STUDY OF PREJUDICE IN HOUSING (1955). Other reviewers
have demonstrated persuasively that Meyer's criticism of Abrams is unsound. See
Jonathan Entin, Book Review, 33 URB. LAW. 189-207 (2001); A. Scott Henderson, Race
Matters: The Folks Next Door, 29 REVIEWS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 119-25 (2001).
' See MEYER, supra note 2, at 1.
'The quality and quantity of data is quite variable, depending on Meyer's access to
contemporaneous accounts and secondary sources-ranging from in-depth to very
partial, including simply the number of house bombings in a city in a specified time
period.
2002] RACIAL CONFLICT INAMERCAN NEIGHBORHOODS 337
[M]ost observers have tended to misjudge the extent, character, and
significance of the resistance perpetrated against African American in-
migrants. They have focused on the largest housing conflicts-riots in
Chicago in 1919 and 1966, Detroit in 1942, and Cicero, Illinois, in 1951.
i.. [Some] observers... have claimed that violence occurred only dur-
ing the initial penetration of a neighborhood, that it happened once
and then subsided, and that it "crested during the 1920s," recurring only
sporadically thereafter .... Resistance against African Americans mov-
ing into white districts occurred more commonly as thousands of small
acts of terrorism. And this study [which focuses on the first two-thirds of
the century] shows that, rather than cresting in the 1920s, resistance
persisted throughout the century, the most vicious and extensive vio-
lence occurring in the North during the two decades following World
War 11.6
From a different perspective, the book contains an account
of widespread criminal conduct, most frequently crimes of vio-
lence causing great physical, financial, and psychological harm.
These are interracial crimes with white criminals and Black vic-
tims. 7 Although he does not characterize it as such, Meyer has
written about extensive and very serious criminal activity and
the failure, by and large, of the criminal justice system to arrest,
prosecute, convict, and punish the perpetrators of these race-
based crimes.
As re-conceptualized here, Meyer's work stands at the inter-
section of two large historic themes in American race rela-
tions-white violence against Black people and their property
and the manifestations of racism integrated into the criminal
justice system. The existence and treatment of housing-related
crimes reflect deeply embedded individual and institutional ra-
cism-from the perpetrators' motivations to their "justifica-
tions" premised on assumptions of racial inferiority; from the
victims' initial racial indignities to their long-term injuries; and
from the co-conspiratorial or passive response of the police to
the rare and minor punishment meted out by the criminal jus-
tice system.
' See MEYER, supra note 2, at 6.
'They are also manifestations of the use of whites' private power against Blacks in
non-subtle ways, including violence and intimidation.
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Housing-related crimes constitute a relatively unexamined
sub-category of the historically common racist practices that we
now refer to as hate crimes.8 Consequently, Meyer's book
makes more visible the history of one of the least visible aspects
of racial violence and racial discrimination in the criminal jus-
tice system. Meyer's book, in combination with other research
on housing, race, and violence, shows that the whole historical
story of crime, law enforcement, and the criminal justice system
in the housing area is infused with racist attitudes, assumptions
and actions-a pattern that has been persistent over many dec-
ades and pervasive across regions.
As an account of criminal behavior, the book tells of crimes,
the perpetrators and their efforts at 'justification," as well as the
victims and the harms to them and to the society. It also pro-
vides glimpses of what appears to be a failed criminal justice sys-
tem, with a seemingly frequent lack of police protection for
Black entrants and the general absence of arrests, prosecution,
and punishment of the wrongdoers.
8 HERBERT SHAPIRO, WHITE VIOLENCE AND'BLACK RESPONSE 374-77 (1988). Though
this is a very extensive and detailed treatment of that subject, it pays relatively little at-
tention to housing-related violence, emphasizing instead lynchings and police brutal-
ity as well as Blacks' physical, organizational and political response to those forms of
violence. (However, he does discuss post-World War II housing-related violence in
Chicago).
Similarly, the major books on race and the criminal justice system devote their at-
tention to other aspects of the system than arrest and prosecution for housing-related
racial crimes. See generally DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999) (analyzing the ways in which racial dis-
crimination pervades the criminal justice system and the social costs of this double
standard and recommending remedies for the problem); RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE,
CRIME, AND THE LAw (1998) (examining the race question in the criminal law context,
focusing especially on procedural questions such as jury selection and punishment
issues such as the death penalty and sentencing for drug-related offenses).
Since Meyer did not set out to write about crime and punishment, he did not look
systematically at the role of the police, the prosecution, and the courts in response to
the crimes he recounts. As a result, there is a great deal of missing data about the na-
ture and extent of the crimes and especially about the response of the criminal justice
system. Thus, any conclusions about police, prosecution, and punishment must be
very tentative.
This dearth of literature also points to the need for additional research on the
criminal justice aspects of the period Meyer addressed, in addition to the need to
bring the story up to the current time, as discussed infra pp. 396-414. In addition to
the need for a more in-depth description of the response of law enforcement officials
and the criminal justice system to these crimes, further research could profitably ana-
lyze the causes and consequences of those responses.
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This Essay recasts Meyer's account as a story about crime
and punishment-or lack thereof. It begins by identifying the
kinds of information that would serve to provide a comprehen-
sive picture of these kinds of crimes during the period Meyer
examines-recognizing that his account falls far short of such a
complete assessment. It continues with an examination of the
crimes that Meyer and others have identified-their location
(across regions of the country, locations within metropolitan ar-
eas); the time periods (continuity and change over the first two-
thirds of the twentieth century); the timing of the crimes rela-
tive to move-ins (immediate, escalation and de-escalation over
time); and the nature of the offenses (various crimes against
persons and property crimes). It then turns to the perpetrators,
including individuals, white supremacist organizations, and ad
hoc groups, ranging from mobs of hundreds of thousands to
single offenders, and their identity, to the extent it is known-
by class, gender, age-including men, women, and children.9
Following the discussion of perpetrators is an examination
of what they and their advocates offered as rhetorical (if not le-
gal) 'justifications" for these acts, including "self-defense," de-
fense of property, "necessity" (public health and military
metaphors), and "deputization" for "norm enforcement" pur-
poses.
A consideration of the victims reveals characteristics of both
the property and the persons affected. Frequently, the attacks
were aimed at Black owners of single-family homes. Middle-
class status based on education and income offered no protec-
tion against racial crimes. ("In spatial relations, race matters
more than economic class.")1 ° Even wealthy Black celebrities
have been victims of these racist crimes. An assessment of the
impacts of the crimes on the victims reveals very serious physical
(injury and death), financial (property damage, cancellation of
insurance, medical expenses, etc.), and psychological (emo-
tional trauma, chilling effect on other moves) harms or injuries.
An examination of the action and inaction of the criminal jus-
tice system-including local and state police, prosecutors, and
9 SeeMEYER, supra note 2, at 9.
" See id. at 11.
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elected officials, as well as federal officials-shows a pattern of
little law enforcement and even less punishment in these cases."
This Essay also suggests that the housing-related crimes that
Meyer describes as continuing into the 1960s persisted through
the rest of the century and beyond, and it argues that additional
systematic research is needed to identify the nature and extent
of this continuing problem. The concluding section includes
some anecdotal data about the continuing nature of racial resis-
tance and identifies research that would help in constructing a
more complete account of the post-1960s patterns of crime and
punishment.
I. CRIME DATA: IDEAL AND ACTUAL
A comprehensive picture of racially motivated housing-
related crimes during the period Meyer examines-up until the
passage of the Federal Fair Housing Act in 1968-would identify
the extent to which criminal activity characterized whites' re-
sponse to Blacks moving into predominantly white neighbor-
hoods and communities. 2 It would show the frequency of such
offences-the crimes rates-as well as the probability of crimi-
nal resistance to integrationist moves. It would also capture the
efforts of law enforcement officials to prevent these crimes and
their response, along with that of the criminal justice system, to
these crimes.
Ideally, such an analysis would include all such offenses in
the period.13 For each instance, the discussion would spell out
" While Meyer does not look at Blacks' responses to white resistance in any depth,
it is clear that Blacks were not passive in the face of these crimes and the law en-
forcement failures. Some individuals engaged in self-help tactics, while organizations
such as the NAACP advocated for broader remedies such as fair housing legislation.
" This essay follows Meyer's approach of focusing exclusively on white on Black
crime and thus does not treat other race-based housing-related crimes, such as those
that whites committed against Asian-Americans during World War II. The issues of
segregation and violence have affected other groups as well in a plethora of ways, and
they also merit close examination.
" This essay focuses on housing-related crimes; but it is important to recognize
that Blacks moving into white areas were victimized in other parts of these predomi-
nantly white neighborhoods and communities. Given the level of hostility and ani-
mosity reflected in many home-based encounters, it is likely that other crimes
occurred elsewhere in the neighborhood or larger community in many instances. As-
saults, damages to cars, and other crimes of person and property away from their
home probably beset the families described in the book, as well as other Black mov-
340
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the facts in sufficient detail to make it possible to identify the of-
fenses involved in individual incidents or multiple victimiza-
tions. It would identify the numbers, identities, and
characteristics of perpetrators-including their gender and
age-along with their organizational affiliations, if any. Simi-
larly, it would describe the victims, including their family com-
position and economic and social circumstances, as well as the
nature and extent of the physical, financial, and psychological
injuries they suffered.
Such a portrait of crimes and punishment would also in-
clude police initiatives at prevention of these crimes and their
efforts to investigate and apprehend and arrest the perpetrators,
as well as the record of arrests and initial charges against alleged
perpetrators. In cases of arrests, the examination would follow
cases through the criminal justice system, including the charges
prosecutors filed, if any, and the number and nature of plea
bargains. For cases going to trial, the analysis would include the
defenses raised by defendants, as well as the disposition of the
case, including the determinations by judges and juries and the
punishments assessed upon conviction.
Any actual research project would inevitably fall short of this
exhaustive account of crime and punishment. Meyer's analysis
falls well short in a number of ways and for a number of rea-
sons-many of which are either beyond his control or beyond
the scope of his study.
In cataloguing whites' resistance to Black entrants through
the late 1960s, Meyer chronicles more integration-related
ers. For example, the extended Trumbull Park public housing episode discussed su-
pra, whites victimized Black residents on the nearby streets and in the neighborhood
stores, parks, and churches, as well as in and around their homes. As a result, this
analysis almost certainly substantially understates the amount of victimization families
encountered. If their homes did not serve as a refuge from racist attacks, it is likely
that many of them faced similar treatment in other parts of their neighborhood or
community. A white woman threatened violence in a store, but did not carry out the
threat, perhaps because it was a public setting, and she could not be anonymous. See
MEYER, supra note 2, at 120. Meyer also referred briefly to the schools as a setting for
racial encounters. See id. at 128. A Black Chicago family that moved to a predomi-
nantly white suburb reported that white teenagers tried to force her off the road as
she was driving in her community. See LEONARD S. RUBINOWITZ ET AL., CROSSING THE
CLASS AND COLOR LINES: FROM PUBLIC HOUSING TO WHITE SUBURBIA 96 (2000). For
crimes against Black students in the predominantly white Little Rock Central High
School in the late 1950s, see MELBA PATTILLO BEALS, WARRIORS DON'T CRY (1994).
342 LEONARD S. RUBINOWJTZ & IMAM PERRY [Vol. 92
crimes in more places and over a longer period of time than
anyone else, but he does not claim that he has uncovered all
such incidents during that time.' In fact, many incidents did
not find their way into his discussion. 15 or example, while
Meyer argues that the problem persisted at least through the
late 1960s, he does not include accounts of specific incidents
during that decade. However, other sources fill that gap and
support his claim of continuing attacks on Black entrants.
6
(See Appendix B for a listing of additional housing-related
crimes from the late nineteenth century through the 1960s
compiled from other sources).
In many cases, it is impossible to tell whether the offense
that Meyer identifies was part of a series of crimes perpetrated
against a particular family. For example, he sometimes refers to
a bombing or a series of bombings in a community, without
elaboration." In some of these cases, the bombings were
probably the culmination of a series of crimes-perhaps an es-
calating campaign to eject a family-including cross burnings,
window breaking, or threatening telephone calls. However, the
sources that report the bombings may not pick up those earlier
offenses."
Meyer has put together an eclectic collection of data that is both extensive and
uneven. He uses a wide variety of published and unpublished sources, including or-
ganization's archives, media accounts, and secondary sources, and the accounts vary
widely in their level of detail-from the specifics of a particular bombing to simply
identifying the numbers of bombings in particular places during specific time peri-
ods. Perhaps because he covers the whole country. and an extended time period, the
study is neither exhaustive nor systematic. Since the book grew out of a doctoral dis-
sertation, the resources available were presumably limited, thus constraining Meyer's
ability to identify incidents throughout the country during such an extended period.
Consequently, it is impossible to extrapolate from his accounts to the entire picture.
As Appendix B shows, there were many such crimes that Meyer did not examine; but
the appendix does not purport to complete the story, either. Even without a com-
plete accounting, the crimes discussed in the book and in this essay demonstrate a
deep problem of a social context in which so many of these crimes have occurred and
apprehension, prosecution, conviction, and punishment have rarely followed.
" The discussion of such incidents will indicate when the source is other than
Meyer's book.
" The discussion of such incidents will indicate when the source is other than
Merer's book.
See MEyER, supra note 2, at 20, 30, 100, 112.
,In order to extrapolate from information about bombings to estimates of other
associated crimes, it would be necessary to do in-depth research on individual inci-
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At the same time, an even more exhaustive inventory than
Meyer's would inevitably miss incidents that were not reported
to the police or the media and were not picked up by some
other researcher.' 9 Underreporting is a chronic problem in de-
termining crime rates.20  That problem is exacerbated in this
case. There are good reasons to suspect that many Black victims
of housing-related crimes did not report them to the police or
make them public in any way." Blacks may have feared retalia-
tion and even escalation if they complained to the police or the
media. Moreover, many Blacks did not trust the police or the
media, almost all of whom were white, especially when they be-
lieved ,that the police and the media would side with the white
racists. Many Blacks shared a perception that, at best, the
criminal justice system was ineffective in apprehending and
prosecuting offenders in these cases."
dents or determine the extent to which patterns of escalation characterized white re-
sistance.
" While urban newspapers are an important source for tracking these encounters,
some incidents probably occurred in suburbs, small towns, and rural areas that were
not fully covered by metropolitan media. Moreover, no single researcher could ex-
amine all of those newspapers for the country over the extended period that Meyer
examines.
20 Perhaps the most significant limitation of crime statistics is that they reflect only
crimes reported to the police. Victimization surveys, which focus on victims and their
experience with crime, may include crimes that are both reported and unreported to
police.
2 Meyer notes that in the 1950s, the NAACP claimed that there was substantial
underreporting of housing-related racial violence in Detroit. See MEYER, supra note 2,
at 122.
Contacting the police could become costly and time-consuming, including lost
time from work and long waiting times. Reporting the crime also required the victim
to re-experience feelings of pain and vulnerability. With the belief that little could be
accomplished, many victims sought to avoid further victimization by the authorities
and the criminal justice system. See Robert F. Kidd and Ellen F. Chayet, Why Do Vic-
tims Fail to Report? The Psychology of Criminal Victimization, 40, no. 1 JOURNAL OF SOCIAL
ISSUES 39, 42-48 (1984).
It is also possible, of course, that there was some over-reporting-reports of inci-
dents that did not occur or exaggerated versions of what did occur. However, it is
likely that under-reporting far exceeded over-reporting of these kinds of crimes.
" Police departments may wrongly "unfound" a reported crime (determine a
crime to be "false or baseless") and fail to press charges for a variety of administrative
or political reasons. See WEsLEY G. SKOGAN & MICHAEL G. MAXFIELD, COPING WITH
CRIME: INDMIDUAL AND NEIGHBORHOOD REACTIONS 28-29 (1981).
23 I&
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In many cases, there is little or no information on the per-
petrators. This gap is in large part a reflection of the failure of
the police to identify and arrest alleged perpetrators. In other
cases, it is a result of the sketchy information available in
sources on which Meyer relied. 4
In addition, much of the crime and punishment picture is
beyond the scope of Meyer's inquiry. Again, the reactions of
the police and the criminal justice system are not central to his
argument about the persistence and pervasiveness of privately
initiated housing discrimination. He did not set out to cata-
logue crimes and evaluate the performance of law enforcement
officials and the criminal justice system in this area. Conse-
quently, his references to those aspects of the story are not sys-
tematic, and they often lack depth and detail.25
Moreover, in order to follow any of these accounts through
the criminal justice system, it would be necessary to identify
them as race-related crimes. Before the relatively recent advent
of "hate crimes," police and prosecutors' records would simply
identify traditional offense categories rather than categorize the
crimes as instances of whites' resistance to Blacks moving into
the neighborhood.
So while the information available in Meyer's book and
elsewhere falls far short of the ideal comprehensive picture, the
available information tells a story of widespread and serious
crimes committed in many places over many decades, appar-
ently with little apprehension and punishment of the perpetra-
tors. The following discussion of crime and punishment is
based primarily on Meyer's accounts; but it also incorporates
accounts from other sources to supplement the picture that he
provides. It begins with the housing-related crimes that whites
perpetrated against Black entrants, considers the perpetrators
and their victims, follows the process through the response of
law enforcement officials and through the justice system, and
concludes with the punishment of those found guilty of these
crimes.
"4 See MEYER, supra note 2, at 122.
25 See id. at 33, 57, 76, 77.
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II. THE CRIMES
While Meyer acknowledges that whites sometimes welcomed
Blacks into "their" neighborhoods-with or without open
arms-he focuses on those occasions where whites chose to re-
sist Black entry in an attempt to make them so unwelcome that
they would leave.26 Accounts dating back to the late nineteenth
century show that Blacks moving into predominantly white areas
faced a substantial risk of encountering racial hostility and be-
coming victims of crimes to their person or property. While the
available data do not permit a precise estimate of the number of
various categories of housing-related crimes, major and minor
offenses undoubtedly number in the thousands." Moreover,
the number might have been far larger if the crimes themselves
had not deterred many Black families from moving into pre-
dominantly white areas where they risked becoming victims of
racist attacks. 8 Whites' actions in opposition to Black residents
ranged from clearly criminal actions, such as bombings, arson,
cross burnings, and vandalism, to those protected by the First
Amendment, such as offers to buy the home and the use of ra-
cial epithets. Moreover, many acts recounted in Meyer's book
and elsewhere may or may not have constituted crimes, depend-
ing on the particular state criminal code and the specific facts,
which were often sketchy and incomplete.
While the wide variety of criminal activities in which whites
engaged would constitute "hate crimes" under much current
legislation, state laws criminalized these acts against persons and
property long before the concept of "hate crimes" emerged.
" Meyer acknowledges that some Blacks were well received, noting the examples
of the "races cohabiting harmoniously" in Trends in Housing, the newsletter of the
National Committee against Discrimination in Housing. MEYER, supra note 2, at 140.
While he claims that in most instances in the period he studied whites have reacted
unfavorably to Blacks moving in, he does not set out to explore that whole record in a
systematic way. See id. at 11. Even if he had wanted to examine the overall patterns
and practices, that would have been feasible only through an in-depth study of a local
situation. See generally L.X. NORTHWOOD & ERNEST A.T. BARTH, URBAN
DESEGREGATION: NEGRO PIONEERS AND THEIR WHITE NEIGHBORS (1965) (study of a
small number of Black families that moved into predominantly white Seattle neigh-
borhoods in the early 1960s).
" See Appendices A, B, and C for an indication of the magnitude of these offenses.
2See discussion infra p. 386, of the chilling effect of these crimes on Blacks' mobil-
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Emphasizing the criminal nature of these accounts underlines
their gravity-the intentionality of the perpetrators, the voli-
tional nature of their acts, and the seriousness of the harms they
caused.
A. LOCATION: THE SITES OF THE CRIMES
There are three locational aspects of these crimes-re-
gional, metropolitan, and home-based. First, one of Meyer's
central themes is that the pattern cut across regions. The
crimes were not limited to the South, and, in fact, they occurred
more frequently in the North and West. Second, most were in
central cities of metropolitan areas rather than suburbs or rural
areas. Finally, the particular crimes examined took place in or
around Black families' homes.
1. The Regional Locus of Housing-Related Crimes
Meyer devotes the majority of his attention to the North,
where many of the worst attacks took place.2 White southerners
were used to having Blacks living in close proximity, dating back
to slavery, and they did not find the presence of Blacks nearby
threatening to their dominance and supremacy.0 In the North,
intense discrimination and segregation dating from the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when large numbers
of Blacks migrated to northern cities, made any breach of that
pattern threatening to whites.31 In Chicago and other northern
cities, the block-by-block racial transition or resegregation proc-
ess at mid-century also contributed to strong reactions by whites
to the arrival of the first Black families in the neighborhood.
3 2
Thus, the saying-"The South doesn't care how close a Negro
gets just so he doesn't get too high; the North doesn't care how
high he gets just so he doesn't get too close."33
29 See MEYER, supra note 2, at 5.
See id. at 5, 98.
"See id. at 30, 32, 46, 47.
12 See id. at 117, 122, 126.
13 See id. at 13 (quoting a folk axiom in PHIiP A. JOHNSON, CALL ME NEIGHBOR,
CALL ME FRIEND: THE CASE HISTORY OF THE INTEGRATION OF A NEIGHBORHOOD ON
CHICAGO'S SOUTH SIDE 17 (1965)).
[Vol. 92
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Chicago is perhaps the outstanding example of a place
where racial crimes occurred around housing conflicts over an
extended period of time.34 These crimes became the norm in
Chicago the way other forms of racial violence, such as
lynchings and church bombings, became commonplace in the
South. From the threatened violence of the late nineteenth
century by white south side neighbors, to the bloody race riot of
1919, to the public housing violence of the 1940s and 1950s, to
the violent resistance to the open housing marches led by Mar-
tin Luther King and local civil rights activists in 1966, Dr. King's
comment that southern racists could learn something about ra-
cism from Chicago whites fit all too well.35 Thus, the Chicago
Freedom Movement, as it was called, was one of many occasions
for anti-integration white Chicagoans to act out with extremely
violent actions. 36
Similarly, Detroit witnessed a continuous stream of housing-
related racial crimes between World War II and the 1960s. 37
There were over two hundred incidents against Blacks moving
into predominantly white neighborhoods, many of which in-
volved window breaking, arson, vandalism, and physical at-
tacks.38 The problem peaked in the mid-1950s, when the city's
economy faced critical problems, and accelerated again in the
early 1960s.' 9 Over the decades, this widespread racial resis-
tance involved thousands of whites, many of whom committed
" For another example of sustained patterns of housing-related racial crimes, see
KEVIN MICHAEL KRUSE, WHITE FLIGHT: RESISTANCE TO DESEGREGATION OF
NEIGHBORHOODS, SCHOOLS AND BUSINESSES IN ATLANTA 1-201 (unpublished Ph.D. dis-
sertation, Cornell University 2000) (on file with authors).
'" See, ALAN B. ANDERSON & GEORGE W. PICKERING, CONFRONTING THE COLOR LINE:
TIE BROKEN PROMISE OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN CHICAGO 223-36 (1986); JAMES
R. RALPH, NORTHERN PROTEST: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., CHICAGO, AND THE CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 120-133 (1993); WILLIAM TInTLE, RACE RIOT 161 (1985); ARNOLD
HIRSCH, MAKING THE SECOND GHETrO: RACE AND HOUSING IN CHICAGO, 1940-1960 40-
67 (1983).
See MEYER, supra note 2, at 183-88.
'7 See THOMASJ. SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE AND INEQUALITY IN
POSTwAR DETROIT 233 (1996).
3Id.
39 Id.
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crimes against hundreds of Black victims who were among the
first families to cross the residential color line.0
2. Intra-Metropolitan Differences
At the local level, most of the crime reports came from cen-
tral cities.4' To the extent that these accounts reflect real differ-
ences in central city and suburban experiences, there may be
several possible explanations. First, for much of the first half of
the century, the majority of the metropolitan population re-
sided in central cities, and most of the contested, racialized
space was located there as well.4"
Moreover, as suburban growth skyrocketed after World War
II, Blacks were largely excluded from this exodus. Many legal
and practical barriers kept most Blacks from moving to the sub-
urbs in the first place.4" For example, FHA mortgage insurance
helped to fuel the suburban migration; but FHA policies and
practices denied Blacks seeking to move to predominantly white
suburbs access to mortgage insurance.44 Since very few Black
families had the opportunity to move to the suburbs in the af-
termath of the war, there were few occasions for white subur-
banites to engage in the kinds of resistance that Meyer
chronicles.
It is also possible, of course, that white suburbanites were
not as hostile as their city counterparts to Blacks' arrival and
presence in their midst. 5 The threat of additional Black entry-
what whites often referred to as an "invasion"-may not have
seemed as great because of the distance from Black enclaves or
40 id1.
1 The apparent concentration of these crimes in central cities may be a function
of different incidences of housing-related crimes or simply differences in the avail-
ability of data about cities and suburbs. See discussion supra pp. 343-344.
" See generally KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER (1985) (examining what
the author argues is the uniquely American pattern of suburban development).
"' See generally LEONARD S. RUBINOWITZ, LOW-INCOME HOUSING: SUBURBAN
STRATEGIES (1974) (discussing the barriers to Black and low-income entry into the
suburbs and strategies for overcoming them).
" See Leonard Rubinowitz & Elizabeth Trosman, Affirmative Action and the American
Dream: Implementing Fair Housing Policies in Federal Homeownership Programs, 74 Nw. U.
L. REV. 491, 510-21 (1979).
" See RUBINOWITZ ET AL., supra note 13, at 63.
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the high cost of housing in the local market. 6 Therefore, white
suburbanites may have worried less about potentially being
"overrun" by Blacks.
Moreover, policy and practical considerations may have led
suburbanites to use legal means in an effort to expel Blacks.
Concerns about their community's reputation with subsequent
effects on property values may have led some whites to choose
non-violent strategies to retain racial homogeneity.
At the same time, the accounts include a number of subur-
ban criminal incidents.47 The suburban accounts usually came
from older, inner-ring suburbs occupied by working class and
middle class whites who felt threatened by Blacks' entrance, in
part because of the suburb's proximity to a predominantly Black
city neighborhood. Those suburbs include Cicero and Oak
Park, Illinois (both of which adjoin Chicago); Dearborn, Michi-
gan (next to Detroit); Compton, California (adjacent to Los
Angeles); Shively, Kentucky (outside Louisville); and Levittown,
Pennsylvania (near Philadelphia).4
3. The Home as the Crime Site
As a final spatial aspect of these crimes, the home itself
served as the site for almost all of Meyer's accounts. 9 While one
view about Black life in America locates the home as the one
refuge from racial mistreatment (the one area Black families
can control), Meyer put the lie to that theory, at least for Blacks
moving into predominantly white areas.50 Their homes did not
46 See id. at 63.
Meyer suggests that these crimes might have declined as many whites chose
"flight" over "fight" with the post-war suburbanization of whites. MEYER, supra note 2,
at 115. Sugrue suggests that it was more difficult for Detroit's Blacks to move to the
suburbs than to predominantly white city neighborhoods; but when they did so in the
post-War period, they faced resistance similar to what they encountered in the city.
See Sugrue, supra note 37, at 266.
4 Seeid. at 118 (Cicero and Oak Park); id. at 122 (Dearborn); id. at 127 (Compton);
id. at 137-38 (Shively); id. at 147-48 (Levittown). The one positive suburban move-in
experience Meyer recounts is about Milpitas, California. See id. at 140-41.
" Black entrants were subject to race-based victimization throughout the pre-
dominantly white neighborhoods and communities, including schools, stores, the
streets, places of employment, and religious institutions. For an account of resistance
in schools and businesses, see KRUSE, supra note 34.
" Meyer quotes JOHN R. FEAGIN & MELVIN P. SIEs, LIVING WITH RACISM: THE BLACK
MIDDLE CLASs EXPERIENCE 224 (1994) about home as refuge. Meyer, supra note 2, at
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shelter them from the threat or reality of attacks on their person
or their property.
It is quite understandable that the home did not function as
a refuge in this context. The clear and explicit goal of whites
who engaged in criminal behavior against Black residents was to
drive them out of the neighborhood. The perpetrators under-
stood well that attacking what would otherwise be a refuge from
racism could be the most effective expulsion strategy.
B. THE TIME DIMENSION: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE OVER TIME
Even before Meyer's first account-the 1910 stoning of a
Black family's Baltimore home-whites engaged in criminal ac-
tivity to expel Blacks from "their neighborhood." As early as
1897, white property owners in Chicago's south side Woodlawn
neighborhood "declared war" on their Black neighbors.51 All of
the Black families moved out because of the threat of violence
against them.52 A dozen years later, whites in the adjacent
neighborhood of Hyde Park vandalized Blacks' homes to let
them know that they were not welcome in the area.53
Nor was violent neighborhood racial resistance confined to
the early part of the twentieth century. Changes were incre-
mental, and there was much continuity along with the changes
through the first two-thirds of the century.54
Progress was not linear, but instead reflected an ebb and
flow in the intensity of hostile receptions, depending on whites'
circumstances.' 5 For example, during the Great Depression,
many whites used Blacks as scapegoats for their problems, which
added to the likelihood of victimization for Black entrants.56 In
3. This is not to suggest that Black entrants were not victims of race-based crimes in
the larger neighborhood or community. Meyer's focus on the home precludes an as-
sessment of that aspect of their experience. For a discussion of non-housing related
victimization of Black entrants, see RUBINowrrz ET AL., supra note 13, at 96-99 (efforts
by white drivers to push Blacks' cars off the road, assaults, and threats of violence).
" Tun, supra note 35, at 261.
52 Id.
" See ALLAN SPEAR, BLACK CHICAGO, THE MAKING OF A NEGRO GHETTO, 1890-1920 22
(1969).
See Meyer, supra note 2, at 6.
See id. at 35 (discussing Chicago as an example).
See id. at 62, 78-97.
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the post-World War II years, housing-related crimes spiked
again.5 ' The second Great Migration saw several million Blacks
move from the South to northern cities. 8 At the same time, ur-
ban renewal and highway projects in those cities displaced large
numbers of Blacks who sought relocation housing wherever
they could find it.59 Moreover, the rise in income during the
war increased Black mobility and led some African-American
families to seek housing outside traditional inner city areas.0
Once again, whites responded with increased resistance to Black
entry.
While Meyer argues that white resistance persisted through
the late 1960s, the last of the incidents he describes took place a
decade earlier.6 ' However, other sources identify numerous
crimes of resistance that support his claim of persistent racism.
One of the most dramatic episodes took place in Chicago, in
Mayor Richard J. Daley's neighborhood of Bridgeport in 1964.
A civil rights worker tried to integrate Daley's street to test the
" See id. at 78, 80, 89.
58 See id. at 79, 80. See generally NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE PROMISED LAND: THE GREAT
BLACK MIGRATION AND How IT CHANGED AMERICA (1991) (chronicling the Great Mi-
gration through the story of a family moving between Mississippi and Chicago).
'9 See id. at 55, 88, 90, 103. See generally MARTIN ANDERSON, THE FEDERAL BULLDOZER
(1967) (criticizing the federal urban renewal program because of its displacement ef-
fects, among other grounds).
'0 See id. at 79, 85, 88.
" For other sources that can shed light on white responses in the 1960s, see gener-
ally W. SCOTT FORD, INTERRACIAL PUBLIC HOUSING IN BORDER CITY (1972); CAROLE
GOODWIN, THE OAK PARK STORY: COMMUNITY CONTROL OF RACIAL CHANGE (1979); W.
DENNIS KEATING, THE SUBURBAN RACIAL DILEMMA: HOUSING AND NEIGHBORHOODS
(1994); DAVID KIRP ET AL., OUR TOwN: RACE, HOUSING, AND THE SOUL OF SUBURBIA
(1995); RUSS RYMER, AMERICAN BEACH (2000).
In addition to the move-in related crimes, there were "housing movement-related"
crimes. The most dramatic examples are the white response to open housing dem-
onstrations in Chicago in the summer of 1966. As the demonstrators in the Chicago
Freedom Movement marched into white neighborhoods, counter-demonstrators
threw rocks at them, including one that hit King in the head. Whites also rolled
Blacks' cars into the lagoon near where they had parked them. See ALAN B.
ANDERSON, CONFRONTING THE COLOR LINE 223-25 (1986), for an example of mob vio-
lence is response to housing in marches.
Violence also greeted open housing demonstrators marching into the south side
of Milwaukee in 1967. Father James Groppi, a Catholic priest, led these demonstra-
tions. Summarize the crimes committed against them and anything about arrests and
prosecutions. See MEYER, supra note 2, at 189-96.
62 See MIKE ROYKO, Boss: RIcHARDJ. DALEY OF CHICAGO 129-32 (1971). This account
is based on Royko's recounting of the incident.
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mayor's assertion that Chicago was not segregated. He bought a
house containing three apartments, with the intention of rent-
ing one of the three apartments to Blacks. Two Black college
students moved in on a Friday, and over the weekend a white
mob chanted hate messages and threw rocks and bottles at the
apartment. 61 Shortly thereafter, the police entered the apart-
ment and removed the students' belongings while they were at
school. The neighbors entered and smeared the walls with ex-
crement. When the Black students returned from school, they
were taken to the police station and told that they had been
evicted and no longer lived in Bridgeport.
In another neighborhood on Chicago's south side, there
were cross burnings when Blacks started moving into a white
enclave in the 1960s.64 Also in the 1960s, there was an episode
in the virtually all-white working class Detroit suburb of Warren.
Many Blacks worked in the auto plant there, but very few Blacks
lived in this community of 180,000 people. Blacks referred to
Warren as a "sundown community," because they knew that they
were supposed to get out of town by sundown. When an inter-
racial couple moved into Warren, an angry mob of whites
threatened them.65 The local police could not, or would not,
control the mob, so Michigan Governor George Romney called
on the National Guard to control the situation.
As will be discussed later, the 1960s also witnessed a break-in
and vandalism of the home of professional basketball star Bill
Russell in a predominantly white Boston suburb.6 And in Bos-
ton itself, efforts in 1962 by the Boston Housing Authority
(BHA) to integrate its developments by moving Black families
" See id. at 131. Three Black couples had each agreed to move in but out of fear of
this notoriously unwelcome neighborhood decided not to do so. See id. at 130.
64 See Louis ROSEN, THE SOUTH SIDE: THE RACIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AN AMERICAN
NEIGHBORHOOD 58-60 (1998). Rosen does not indicate whether there were any ar-
rests or prosecutions. Other than the cross burnings, Rosen suggests that there was
little violence. Some participants claimed that this was because it was a heavily Jewish
neighborhood, and Jews were unlikely to resort to violence. See id. at 93-94. At the
same time, whites made clear in various ways that Blacks were not welcome in the
neighborhood, and many middle class families moved away. See id. at 13-14, 47, 78-80,
99-100, 123.
65 This account is also based on the experience of the first author as an official of
the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.
6 See infra note 204 and accompanying text.
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into public housing in south Boston led to violent resistance by
neighborhood residents. When the BHA rented an apartment
to a lone elderly Black woman, her apartment was stoned on
two successive nights even before she finished moving in, result-
ing in twenty-four broken windowpanes.
6
' Boston's public hous-
ing served as the scene of large numbers of racist housing-
related crimes in the 1960s.68 In 1965, a fifteen-year period of
racial resistance began in Boston's public housing program as
the agency attempted to integrate mostly white-occupied public
housing in white neighborhoods.69 In the first two years of this
effort, Black in-movers reported a wide variety of incidents, in-
cluding crimes to the person-assaults and death threats-as
well as attacks on property-damaged cars, ignited papers thrust
under apartment doors, fecal material at their doorway, racial
epithets on their doors, and rocks, bricks, bottles, and other de-
bris thrown through their windows. In the summer of 1968, a
new upsurge of violence included the throwing of Molotov
cocktails, arson, and shootings.70
This violent resistance continued into the 1970s, culminat-
ing in the homicide of a young Black man by two white youths.
7 '
In 1973, two nineteen-year-old white public housing residents
attacked and killed George Pratt, a seventeen-year-old high
school junior and former resident. 7 The two ex-marines began
by throwing bottles at him and ended by gunning him down
from the roof of the building, with a rifle shot to the forehead.
While most witnesses refused to testify against their friends, one
67 See LAWRENCE VALE, FROM THE PURITANS TO THE PROJECTS: PUBLIC HOUSING AND
PUBLIC NEIGHBORHOODS 303 (2000) [hereinafter VALE, FROM THE PURITANS TO THE
PROJECTS].
Since Meyer has no accounts from the 1960s, he does not discuss the public
housing situation in Boston. The racial resistance that struck there in the 1960s con-
tinued into the 1970s and flared up again in the 1990s. See discussion infra pp. 407-
08.
69 See generally LAWRENCE J. VALE, SALVAGING PUBLIC HOUSING: A HALF-CENTURY OF
STRUGGLES IN THREE PUBlIC NEIGHBORHOODS (forthcoming 2002) [hereinafter VALE,
SALVAGING PUBLIC HOUSING] (examining the efforts to revitalize three public housing
developments in Boston) (on file with authors).
" See id. at Chapter 2.
71 Id.
72 Id.
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fourteen-year-old ultimately testified, and an all white jury con-
victed the two perpetrators of manslaughter (not murder)."
C. TIMING OF CRIMES: THE COURSE AND DURATION OF
RESISTANCE
For individual families, the time dimension focuses on when
criminal resistance began relative to a Black family moving in
and what happened over time-whether the resistance in-
creased, decreased, or stayed at the same level of intensity.
Criminal activity sometimes occurred as an immediate response
to a move-in, apparently out of impatience, anger, or perhaps a
lack of confidence that other strategies would lead to the fam-
ily's departure or punish them sufficiently for their moving in.
Initial resistance sometimes declined when it became clear that
the Black family intended to remain in their home.
In other cases, crimes constituted a strategic escalation after
legal and other extra-legal methods failed to expel a family.74
The crimes sometimes increased in seriousness over time.75 This
"last resort" crime may have followed a series of unsuccessful
removal strategies, such as neighbors trying to persuade the
family to leave or offering to buy the house (sometimes even of-
fering to pay a premium or moving expenses), police or elected
officials requesting the family's departure, or private citizens us-
ing threatening phone calls or letters (which may have war-
ranted criminal liability). Black families' non-responsiveness to
the first round of efforts to expel them, such as failing to accept
offers that were "generous" or "more than reasonable," pre-
sumably became part of whites' rationale for turning to illegal
approaches.
A Black family's move into a white Louisville suburb in 1954
exemplified the escalation pattern.76 Characterizing the mount-
7id.
71 See Meyer, supra note 2, at 59.
See id. at 33, 34, 77, 118-19.
See DAVID DELANsv, RACE, PLACE, AND THE LAw: 1836-1948 109 (1998). The Lou-
isville experience is particularly illuminating because it was in a border state. It had
the most notable racial zoning ordinance, which was struck down by the Supreme
Court in 1917 in Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917), and it experienced an ab-
sence of open racial friction as long as Blacks "accepted their place." See ANNE
354
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ing resistance as "escalation" arguably makes appropriate use of
the war metaphor.7 The ongoing efforts over a period of
months to expel the Black "invader" began with the burning of
a cross on the vacant lot next door to the house and continued
with a rock thrown through the front picture window (with a
piece of paper wrapped around it with "NIGGER GET OUT"
written on it) and another cross burning, followed by about ten
rifle shots fired into the house in the middle of the night, and
culminating in the bombing of their house.
8
D. THE OFFENSES
The offenses included crimes against persons and property
crimes. (Appendix A provides a listing of the crimes that Meyer
describes, including their location and time.) Moreover, many
of the property crimes, such as bombings, arson, and gunshots
fired through windows, exhibited at least recklessness with re-
spect to harm to residents of the home and may have been
knowing or purposeful relative to that harm.
9
The acts implicating criminal liability include telephone
and mail threats, cross burnings, brick throwing, fire settings,
bombings, beatings, throwing people out of their home, shoot-
ings, other mob actions, failures to protect entrants, and other
actions that were part of the campaigns against integration.
The offenses included, among others, assault, aggravated as-
sault, reckless endangerment, terroristic threats, kidnapping,
criminal coercion, arson, reckless burning or exploding, caus-
ing or risking catastrophe, criminal mischief, resisting arrest, of-
ficial oppression, riot, failure to disperse, disorderly conduct,
and harassment.
80
BRADEN, THE WALL BETWEEN (1999). The Wall Between illustrates what happened when
a Black family "forgot its place."
" See MEYER, supra note 2, at 137-38. For a detailed account of this experience, see
BRADEN, supra note 76.
78 The Louisville experience provides a basis for speculating that in some other
bombings, less serious criminal offenses preceded the bombing. Since Meyer did not
focus on crimes, his account provides little data to support this speculation. See
Meyer, supra note 2, at 62, 66, 67, 138.
71 In Detroit, most of the crimes were property crimes; only a few involved attacks
on Black entrants themselves. See SUGRUE, supra note 37, at 254, 358 n.68.
" While most of the crimes Meyer recounts occurred before 1962 when the Model
Penal Code was published, MPC categories provide a convenient and uniform de-
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The offenses included inchoate crimes, as well. Attempts
included arsons that failed and bombs that did not explode.'
Also, with mobs and white supremacists playing a prominent
role in this criminal activity, conspiracies abounded. The com-
munal effort to expel the Wilsons from their Detroit home in
1955 is one of many cases in point.82 A broad cross section of
neighbors-parents, children of various ages, and elderly peo-
ple-planned and agreed on an assignment of roles designed to
achieve their criminal purposes.83
III. THE PERPETRATORS
84
Racism was so deeply embedded that ordinary citizens who
viewed themselves as law-abiding and peaceful were prepared to
engage in violence and other criminal activity to expel Black
families from their communities.85 They could do so knowing
that they probably would not be pursued or apprehended by
the police, or prosecuted, convicted, or punished.
Meyer uses the term "neighbor" to apply to those who were
not part of the white supremacy movement, but who became ac-
tive in resisting the entry of a Black family into "their" neigh-
borhood." These were ad hoc "grass roots" efforts of residents
acting individually or coming together in response to a per-
ceived common threat.
scription of offenses. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 211.1, 211.2, 211.3, 212.1, 212.5, 220.1,
220.3, 242.2, 243.1, 250.2, 250.3, 5.03 (1985).
81 In Chicago, there were eleven incidents of attempted arson between 1949 and
1951. MEYER, supra note 2, at 118. In 1940, vandals attempted to bomb a Black fam-
ily's home. Id. at 59. In 1947, someone hurled a pipe bomb through the window of a
Black family's home in a white Atlanta neighborhood, but it failed to explode. Id. at
102.
82 See SUGRUE, supra note 37, at 231-33.
83 See id. at 249-50.
84 Meyer discounts but does not totally reject the periodic claims by white officials
that the real, behind-the-scenes perpetrators were Communists trying to foment ten-
sion between the races as part of a scheme to overthrow the government. See MEYER,
supra note 2, at 137-38.
" See SUGRUE, supra note 37, at 211, 233-34, 249-50. The even more dramatic ex-ample of this phenomenon is the mobs that lynched Blacks in the South and the
crowds that attended these lynchings. Parents often.brought young children to watch
these public spectacles.
6 See MEYER, supra note 2, at 36, 59, 108.
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Housing-related crimes had two faces. The public, visible,
and open face consisted of mobs that used threats, intimidation,
and overt violence in an attempt to drive out Black families.
The private, invisible, and anonymous face avoided direct, face-
to-face confrontation with those families. It was composed of
threatening phone callers that used the anonymity of that me-
dium to hide their identity and cross-burners and bombers that
used the cover of darkness or disguise to carry out their destruc-
tive purposes.87
A. VISIBLE PERPETRATORS: MOBS, WOMEN, AND CHILDREN
1. Mobs
Meyer cites numerous accounts of "mobs" forming in re-
sponse to the movement of a Black family into their neighbor-
hood or community.88 These "mobs" ranged from 50 to 10,000
people, with most numbering between 200 and 2000. Labeling
the gathering a mob connotes its threatening and dangerous
nature as well as its size. However, not all of the mobs' hostile
actions constituted crimes. It requires a closer look to deter-
mine the extent to which crimes were involved when mobs ar-
rived on the scene.
In many cases, the formation of mobs in response to the ar-
rival of Black families did lead to criminal activity. Participants'
willingness to engage in criminal activity in pursuit of their ob-
jectives suggests the depth of racism in the local white culture.
87 See SUGRUE, supra note 37, at 253, on the cover of darkness. This emphasis on
private actors as perpetrators is consistent with Meyer's general theme that the story
of racism in the housing market is not just about government policies and practices
and institutions like real estate brokers. His account emphasizes the role of private
citizens, including white supremacist organizations and ad hoc "organizations of
neighbors" coming together for the sole purpose of driving Black families from their
homes. See MEYER, supra note 2, at 1, 33, 76, 124. His point about white citizens' atti-
tudes and actions comes out most clearly when Blacks overcame the constraints to
moving into white areas and confronted the resistance of their white neighbors and
others. It appears that institutional barriers played a larger role in preventing those
moves in the first place than in the after-the-fact resistance.
8Various of these "mobs" fit one or the other of the following definitions: "a dis-
orderly or riotous crowd of people" or "a crowd bent on or engaged in lawless vio-
lence." Only those engaged in criminal activity are relevant here. See THE RANDOM
HOUSE DICIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1234 (2d ed. 1987).
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The mobs reflected local support for both the ends of expulsion
and the means of illegal group action to expel the "intruders."
Meyer's accounts of mobs support his themes that resistance
was widespread geographically and persisted over the decades.
In fact, most of the "mob scenes" that Meyer describes took
place in the North and West-in Detroit; Chicago and Cicero
(Illinois); Levittown (Pennsylvania); and Los Angeles. 9 The
southern mob actions took place in Miami and Dallas. 90 The ac-
counts of mobs spanned the period from the 1920s through the
1950s.9'
While white supremacist organizations played an important
role, the size of the "mobs" suggests that many ordinary, gener-
ally law-abiding, "mainstream" citizens engaged in racial resis-
tance, much of which constituted criminal behavior. In 1925, a
mob of about five thousand white people threatened to burn
down the home of a Black family that had moved into a white
Detroit neighborhood.' Later that year, and a few blocks away,
whites hurled bricks through the windows of a Black family's
home and ripped tiles from the roof.93 Two decades later, when
the Chicago Housing Authority began to move Black families
into a white-occupied public housing development in a white
neighborhood, a mob smashed windows and tipped over cars.94
There was also some evidence of ethnic solidarity at work-
immigrants and ethnic groups felt particularly threatened by
the arrival of Blacks and reacted accordingly. The strong
response of the heavily Polish south side of Milwaukee to the
Father Groppi-led open housing demonstrations in 1967
illustrates this ethnic solidarity.9  Similarly, ethnic
neighborhoods like Marquette Park on Chicago's southwest side
assaulted open housing marchers and damaged their cars in
1966.96
" See MEYER, supra note 2, at 36-38, 69-70, 92, 122 (Detroit); id. at 117-18 (Chi-
cago); id. at 119 (Cicero); id. at 148 (Levittown).
90 Seeid. at 59 (Dallas); id. at 124 (Miami).
"See id. at 36, 128.
"See id. at 37.
"See id. at 37.
"See id. at 90.
"See id. at 191.
See id. at 185.
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In class terms, there were both middle-class and low-income
mobs, apparently with little mixing of the two groups.97 Many of
the neighbors and their allies were middle-class homeowners,
members of the mainstream.8 Many of these accounts come
from otherwise quiet and peaceful middle-class neighborhoods,
where the neighbors themselves appeared to be leaders of what
they considered to be legitimate resistance to a perceived threat.
In other cases, public housing officials assigned Black fami-
lies to previously all-white public housing developments. White
public housing residents were among the most violent resisters.
The Chicago experience is an extreme example of this phe-
nomenon, in part because it was one of the few public housing
agencies that tried to integrate any of its developments during
the first decades of the public housing program. Once again,
previously law-abiding residents turned to crime to try to expel
Black residents."
For the mob members, there was strength in numbers.
Moreover, while the mobs were visible and very public, individ-
ual participants were generally protected by their anonymity as
part of a large group. For the victims and potential victims,
those numbers signified great danger. Their visible presence
and the internal dynamic that could feed on itself increased the
chances of their actions escalating into the commission of
crimes.
2. Women
While men dominated the resistance efforts, women also
played an important role. Much of women's activity demon-
strating their opposition to integration was protected under the
First Amendment, but some of their actions crossed over into
criminality.'00
Meyer often notes the active and visible participation of
women in mobs and other activities threatening Black residents
97 Sugrue notes that Detroit's perpetrators tended to be working class whites,
whose status was particularly precarious. See SUGRUE, supra note 37, at 235, 241, 244-
45.
See MEYER, supra note 2, at 132.
See icL at 90.
'® See id. at 59.
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and their homes. °1 Women were frequently in the forefront of
the resistance °. The presence of large numbers of women in
the mobs suggested the breadth and depth of whites' opposition
to having Black neighbors and served as a reminder that the at-
tacks were not just the work of a few racist extremists.
While many women engaged in what may have been lawful
picketing and demonstrating outside of Black families' homes,
it appears that women also engaged in criminal activities.0 3 In
1940, women in Dallas stoned the house of a Black family,
... It is not clear whether women were involved in bombings, cross burnings, and
other surreptitious crimes, since police rarely identified suspects in these cases.
Meyer does not have any reports of women claiming credit for bombings, as occurred
when a woman claimed credit for bombing Dr. Martin Luther King's house in Mont-
gomery, Alabama in 1956, during the bus boycott there. DAYBREAK OF FREEDOM: THE
MONTGOMERY BUS BoYcoTr 135 (Stewart Burns ed., 1997).
Also, it is not clear whether any women were arrested, prosecuted, or punished if
they were apprehended, tried, and convicted, or whether there were indications of
the "chivalry" of the day that might have led to men being treated more harshly as
perpetrators than women. Thus, it is impossible to know how extensive women's
housing-related criminal activities were during this period.
Moreover, the book's cover underlines the fact of women's participation with a
photograph of a white woman demonstrating and holding a sign that said "keep this
neighborhood white."
102 While Meyer says little about why women's presence seems noteworthy, his im-
plicit implication is that this was surprising and that he expected the resistance to be
"men's work." Moreover, violence and threats were the domain of men, and wives
would not be likely to resort to force even if they shared their husbands' objectives.
Women's actions thus run counter to stereotypes of gender traits and behavior pat-
terns-the contrasts between men as aggressive and inclined towards violence and
criminal behavior and women as passive, non-violent, and law abiding. Thus, singling
out women's activities may reflect stereotyped expectations about women's role in so-
ciety and idealized notions about women's character.
It is not always clear whether Meyer's references to women involve criminal activ-
ity, as opposed to legally protected speech such as holding up a sign on the sidewalk.
Since criminal liability is not his focus, he does not address this question with respect
to women specifically.
03 Massive white opposition arose in 1942 to Black entrance to Sojourner Truth
Homes, a new Detroit public housing development. See MEYER, supra note 2, at 69-71.
While 1,000 whites kept a vigil near the entrance to the development, "thirty women
carrying American flags and placards declaring 'We Want White Neighbors' picketed
the project's administration building." See id. at 69-70. That was after a mob of 700
armed men and women had blocked the entrance to prevent the entry of Black fami-
lies that were scheduled to move in to the complex. Id.
In 1951, 100 housewives picketed and heckled a Black family moving into an
apartment building in Cicero, Illinois, a suburb of Chicago. By the next day, the
demonstrators had turned into a mob estimated at 4,000 people, which firebombed
and gutted the apartment building. See id. at 118-19.
2002] RACIAL CONFLICT INAMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 361
breaking windows.10 4 Later in that decade, Detroit women made
hundreds of phone calls threatening personal harm and prop-
erty damage because of Black families' entry into a white neigh-
borhood.'05 Similarly, when a Black family moved into a white
Louisville suburb in 1954, women made threatening telephone
calls, declaring that there would be "consequences" if the Black
family did not move out of the community. In that same year,
a white woman threatened to throw a bottle of ammonia in the
face of a Black woman who had moved into the white-occupied
Trumbull Park public housing development in Chicago. 7
Several interrelated factors may explain why women partici-
pated actively in the resistance to Black entry.' 8 Perhaps the
most obvious explanation for women's active participation
grows out of the idea of "separate spheres" that continued to
dominate their role as "housewives" during the first half of the
twentieth century.1 9 Women's place was considered to be in the
home, taking care of their husbands and children, while men
were to occupy the "public sphere" of the world of work and the
political arena. The separate spheres regime had both familial
and spatial dimensions. It gave women the responsibility of pro-
tecting the safety and security of their children, themselves, and
of their home against external threats while their husbands
were off at work. The spatial boundaries of women's responsi-
bilities extended beyond the home itself, encompassing the
neighborhood as well."0 Women patrolled the border between
104 See id. at 59.
,05 See id. at 91; see also SUGRUE, supra note 37, at 248.
See BRADEN, supra note 76, at 63.
... See MEYER, supra note 2, at 120.
... See MEYER, supra note 2, at 120. Meyer notes women's fears about neighborhood
deterioration with Black entry, but says little else about the causes and consequences
of women's participation. See SUGRUE, supra note 37, at 250-52.
'0' The term "housewife" is rarely used any more, largely because it implies rigid
gender roles and the lack of choice for women to self-identify as "homemaker," par-
ticipant in the labor force, or both. See id. at 119.
"0 This is part of a larger story of women trying to protect their neighborhoods
against external threats. For an example of a woman leading the opposition to an
urban renewal project in her neighborhood, see the discussion of Florence Scala's ef-
forts to protect her Chicago neighborhood from the wrecker's ball. SeeADAM COHEN
& ELIZABETH TAYLOR, AMERICAN PHARAOH: MAYOR RICHARD J. DALEY HIs BATrLE FOR
CHICAGO AND THE NATION 224-33 (2000).
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the public and private spheres as they joined in the resistance to
Black entry.
Women's historic role emphasized protecting the safety and
security of their children against any threats to their well-being.
Excluding Blacks from the neighborhood was a way of keeping
their children away from bad influences-namely Black chil-
dren-both in the neighborhood and at school. Perhaps most
importantly, white women's job was to protect their children
against the possibility of interracial sex-including the rape of
their daughters-and marriage.111
The spatial aspect of the "private sphere" meant that women
served as neighborhood protectors and representatives of their
family in the neighborhood, on guard against threats to the
neighborhood's social stability, property values, living standards,
and aesthetics. White women perceived themselves as protect-
ing their place by trying to keep Black families "in their place"-
both physically in their own neighborhoods and in terms of
their status."2 White women were the guardians of the "home
front," and part of that responsibility was to serve as gatekeeper
to keep "undesirables" from entering or staying in the neigh-
borhood.
These responsibilities may have been particularly pressing
during the day during the workweek, when their husbands were
away at work. Relatively few white women were in the work
force during this period, except during wartime."' Women
sometimes had the "day shift" for the efforts to expel Black
. See MEYER, supra note 2, at 100. The fears motivating white mothers grew out of
the dominant stereotypes of Black boys and men as sexual predators and Black girls
and women as sexual seducers. Ironically, except for the fear of rape, white women's
fears incorporated an implicit assumption that their children were not as racist as
they were and would succumb to the temptations across racial lines in spite of (or be-
cause of) their parents' admonitions to the contrary. Presumably their fears also grew
out of myths about Blacks' eagerness to engage in sexual relationships across the
color line despite their own parents' wishes and the serious social and other conse-
quences of violating that taboo.
Women may also have been proactive as a prophylactic "self-defense" measure. In
light of the stereotype that Black men constitute a sexual threat to white women,
some white women might have viewed their efforts as a way of protecting themselves
from potential assaults or rapes from the husbands or teenage sons in the entering
families.
See id. at 120; see also SUGRUE, supra note 37, at 250-51.
'J' See SUGRUE, supra note 37, at 251.
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families-some of which included criminal activity. However,
women were "on call" twenty-four hours a day, seven days a
week. As Meyer suggests, women joined forces with men as part
of mobs seeking to expel Black families from their neighbor-
hoods.1 '
For African-American families, the knowledge that women
served in the resistance forces meant that the threats to them-
selves and their homes were ever-present. There was not neces-
sarily any respite during the day when men were away at work.
In addition, there was no identifiable group of non-threatening
people in the area. Given the pervasive stereotypes of the day,
women would be the ones expected to have empathy for outsid-
ers and welcome them to the neighborhood. Meyer's accounts
demonstrate that the newcomers could not count on white
women even as passive observers, much less allies. Instead, they
were potential perpetrators, along with their husbands and
children.
Moreover, women's participation increased the likelihood
that their children would commit crimes of resistance and that
the attitudes reflected in these actions would endure across
generations.15  By resisting Blacks' entry, women taught their
children to be racist and proactive on behalf of their racism-to
believe in racial subordination and to stand up for what they be-
lieved in-to protect their family, their neighborhood, and their
community against external threats in the form of African-
American neighbors."
6
Finally, women's participation may have "normalized" resis-
tance in both a descriptive and normative sense. Given the
,, Women's participation could also have served as protection for their husbands.
Their presence may have reduced the likelihood of arrests, by symbolically reducing
the seriousness of the criminal offenses. Gender stereotypes might also have reduced
the likelihood of women being arrested. Traditional notions of chivalry suggested
that arrest would be an inappropriate response. Moreover, arresting women risked
adding to the tensions in the situation and escalating the level of violence.
If there were arrests, women might have been able to protect their breadwinners
from being arrested, with the attendant risks of loss ofjobs and income. None of this
seemed to matter, practically, because there seemed to be so few arrests; but women's
activism may have served in part as an "insurance policy" for their spouses.
"' See SUGRUE, supra note 37, at 254.
116 In the process, they also taught their children disrespect for the law, since law-
lessness was justifiable in the service of racist objectives.
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stereotypes about women as passive and peaceful, their in-
volvement suggested that even criminal activity was ordinary be-
havior in response to extraordinary provocation. Given the
stereotypes of women as law-abiding citizens, their participation
could have tended to legitimate the means of resistance, at least
in the eyes of other whites.
3. Youth
Youth, especially teenagers, also participated in the racial
resistance. Children saw their parents planning and carrying
out criminal acts to force Blacks out of the neighborhood, so it
is not surprising that there is "child labor" reported in some of
these accounts. Some white parents taught their children to be
active racists, including committing crimes as a means of driving
Black intruders out of their communities. Young people, in-
cluding teenage former public housing residents, appear to
have carried out many of the attacks against Blacks integrating
Boston public housing developments. "7
In Detroit, young people were an integral part of the mas-
sive effort to resist Black movement into white neighborhoods."
8
While their activities were closely linked to those of adults,
groups of teenagers also carried out their own attacks. Young
people often vandalized Black homes, including breaking win-
dows, throwing stones, dumping garbage on the porch of a
Black neighbor, and throwing signs saying "Beat It Nigger" on
the porch of a Black family." 9 Unlike most of their adult coun-
terparts, teenagers also committed physical assaults, including
throwing a firecracker at a Black woman.1 ° Adults, in turn, pro-
tected these young criminals from the police through a code of
silence.'2' White parents accepted these otherwise delinquent
acts as appropriate expressions of community concerns.
Some women even praised their children publicly for par-
ticipating in these kinds of attacks. In Cicero, Illinois (a Chi-
117 See VALE, FROM THE PURITANS TO THE PROJECrs, supra note 67, ch. 2.
L See SUGRUE, supra note 37, at 254-55 (discussing the rationales for youth partici-
pation, the roles they played, and the police response to them).
"' See id. at 254.
120 Id.
121 See id. at 255.
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cago suburb), one hundred white women picketed the home of
a Black family that moved into the neighborhood in 1951 12
One woman reportedly proudly announced, "that's my boy," as
he threw a rock through the family's window.123 The police dis-
missed such acts as "boyish pranks.' '124 In doing so, they deval-
ued the Black victims of crimes. This denial of the existence
of a crime reinforced the stereotype of Blacks as criminals
rather than victims of crime.
B. INVISIBLE, ANONYMOUS PERPETRATORS
Men, women, and children in mobs were often identifiable
(even if the police did not try to identify them). Even so, a de-
gree of anonymity resulted from the size of the mobs and indi-
viduals' ability to meld into the crowd. A mob of five thousand
whites threatened to burn down the home of a Black Detroit
family in 1925,126 while a similarly sized mob sought to keep a
Black family out of a white area public housing development in
Chicago in 1947.127 Four years later, the mob that attacked a
Black family moving into the Chicago suburb of Cicero was es-
timated at four thousand people.2
Other perpetrators went to greater lengths in seeking ano-
nymity, primarily by using the telephone or the mail, by carrying
out attacks while the family was away during the day, by operat-
ing at night under the cover of darkness, or by disappearing
quickly-driving by, attacking, and departing before being iden-
tified.
12 9
... See MEYER, supra note 2, at 118.
'" When whites used force to exclude the family, a "mob of teenagers stormed the
apartment and tossed furniture out of the third-story window to a cheering crowd be-
low." Seeid. at 118.
124 Seeid. at 112, 117.
2' See generally Stephen Carter, When Victims Happen to be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420 n.3
(1988) (examining the role that race plays in defining victimhood, focusing especially
on the case of Bernhard Goetz, a white man who shot four Black youths who were
"hassling him for money" on a NewYork subway in 1987).
1"6 SeeMEYER, supra note 2, at 37.
"2 See id. at 90.
2' See id. at 119.
2' For example, two Black families moving into white Brooklyn neighborhoods in
the 1920s received notes telling them that family members would be killed if they did
not move out of the neighborhood. See id. at 33. In 1953, a Black resident of the Los
LEONARD S. RUBINOWITZ & IMANI PERRY [Vol. 92
C. WHITE SUPREMACISTS
While white supremacist organizations did not dominate
these crimes, they did play an important role. 3 0 The Ku Klux
Klan was most active, resisting Black families' moves around the
country, over many decades.13 ' The organization engaged in a
variety of criminal activities in their expulsion efforts, including
sending threatening letters, burning crosses, and carrying out
bombings.32 Cross burnings, probably the most common KKK
tactic, hit places as far apart as Detroit, Atlanta, Los Angeles,
Nashville, Miami, and Louisville.
Other white supremacist organizations that used criminal
means to achieve their housing-related objectives included the
Columbians, whose members bombed a Black-owned home in
Atlanta in 1946,1 4 and the White Circle League, whose adher-
ents threw bricks, fired pistol shots in the night, and propelled
aerial bombs at a Black family's public housing apartment in a
white Chicago development in 1953.135 Their housing-related
attacks were part of a larger ongoing racist strategy involving a
range of criminal activity.
136
Moreover, those organizations and "ordinary" citizens some-
times came together. The fears of neighbors provided fertile
ground in which white supremacist organizations could operate,
especially when the police and prosecutors actively participated
in or passively observed the attacks. White supremacist organi-
Angeles suburb of Compton came home one evening to discover that vandals had
flooded his house by putting the hose through the mail slot and turning on the water.
See id. at 128. In 1948, someone burned the word "Nigger" at night in the front lawn
of singer Nat King Cole's Los Angeles home. See id. at 96.
See id. at 89, 120.
' See id. at 36, 57, 70, 76, 102, 112, 138, 148, 219.
12 See id. at 102 (threatening letter-Atlanta, 1947-apparent Klan bombings); id.
at 34 (bombing-Staten Island, NY, 1924).
133 See id. at 37 (Detroit, 1925); id. at 57 (Atlanta, 1937); id. at 76 (Los Angeles,
1941); id. at 112 (Nashville, 1949); id. at 124 (Miami, 1945); id. at 128 (Compton,
California, 1953); id. at 138 (Louisville, Kentucky, 1954).
' See id. at 101. The Columbians became active in 1946 in Atlanta as the first neo-
Nazi organization in the United States after World War II. The organization engaged
in extensive verbal attacks and criminal activities against Blacks, especially Black fami-
lies moving into predominantly white Atlanta neighborhoods. See KRUSE, supra note
34, at 19-36.
. See MEYER, supra note 2, at 120.
136 Id.
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zations provoked or joined with "ad hoc" organizations and in-
dividuals because of their shared racism and desire to expel a
Black family from their midst. For example, in 1937, neighbor-
hood residents and the KKK, using a cross-burning among other
tactics, worked together to drive a Black family out of their
home in an all white Atlanta neighborhood.1
7
IV. 'JUSTIFICATIONS" AND RATIONALES
Even though there were apparently few prosecutions for
these crimes, the rhetoric of 'justification" was commonplace.
While the perpetrators were individuals and groups, the justifi-
cations that they offered were structural, rather than being
based on the perpetrators' individual circumstances. The
claims took the form of traditional justifications that served as
defenses to criminal liability, but they did not plausibly fit into
those categories substantively. 38  They were pseudo defenses
that had the structure of defenses, but they had persuasive force
only with the acceptance of the underlying racist assumptions
implicit in the claims. Those assumptions included the belief
that the natural order of things had to be preserved, that race is
a natural phenomenon rather than being socially constructed,
and that whites, as the superior race, had an obligation to sub-
ordinate the inferior race. That responsibility included main-
taining the racial purity of "their" neighborhoods.' 39
Permitting Blacks to live among whites was equated with
"social equality," which the Supreme Court in the Plessy case
Neighborhood property owners and Klansmen also joined forces to keep a Mi-
ami neighborhood white in 1945. Id. at 57, 124.
"' See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (1985) (use of force in self-protection); id. § 3.05
(use of force for the protection of others); id. § 3.06 (use of force for the protection
of property); SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 1145 (1995) ("conduct that would otherwise consti-
tute an offense"); see also MODEL PENAL CODE commentaries § 3.02; KADISH &
SCHULHOFER, supra, at 867; KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra, at 872 (self-help is permitted
in limited situations).
" Thomas Sugrue quotes Black journalist Henry Lee Moon as saying in 1946,
"The white population ... has come to believe that it has a vested, exclusive, and
permanent 'right' to certain districts." SUGRUE, supra note 37, at 209. The active in-
volvement of women in the resistance may have reinforced these claims, since women
were thought to symbolize the core values of family and community.
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thought was not to be.140 In upholding the constitutionality of
the Louisiana railroad segregation statute, the Court concluded
that the claim about riding railroad trains on a desegregated ba-
sis was an argument for "social equality" and that the Equal Pro-
tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was not addressed
to social equality.'4' Even Justice Harlan, the lone dissenter in
the case, suggested that social equality between the races would
not exist even with desegregation of trains.'42
Since there were few people tried for these crimes, these
'Justifications" were usually addressed to the court of public
opinion rather than a judicial forum. The relevant public was
local whites. 43 Far from seeing themselves as criminals, whites
viewed their activities as, at the very least, justified, and, often, as
socially responsible actions to be praised, admired, and re-
spected because of the courage they demonstrated on behalf of
a worthwhile and important cause. There seemed to be two
rhetorical strands. One consisted of cruel caricatures of tradi-
tional justification defenses, including self-defense, defense of
others, and defense of property. The other embodied perverse
parodies of law enforcement rationales, which might be charac-
terized as "self-deputized norm enforcement." Neither ap-
proach constituted a plausible legal argument; but both often
seemed persuasive to much of the white community.
4
The arguments that mimicked conventional claims about
defense of the person generally combined self-defense and de-
fense of others into an argument that might be characterized as
"selves defense," or defense of all the white people in the
neighborhood or community. 14  In some cases, the claim ex-
tended to the entire country-a defense of the country against
140 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1986).
141 See id. at 544.
142 See id. at 552; see also MEYER, supra note 2, at 72.
,43 There is little information about the extent to which these justification defenses
were used in trials. There were probably very few trials for these crimes, since arrests
and prosecutions seemed rare.
144 See id. at 132.
"5 See id. at 110. In Atlanta in the 1950s and 1960s, the term "community integrity"
served as a way of delineating white neighborhoods that were to be protected from
Blacks because of their "strong sense of past community and a present unity of pur-
pose." See KRUSE, supra note 34, at 129.
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the communist conspiracy which was trying to foment racial
strife by orchestrating these moves. Perpetrators often mixed in
arguments about property, as well, with the twist that their ac-
tions were in defense of "property values" rather than property
itself.
These defenses relied on stereotyping and stigmatizing
Blacks through the use of metaphors that implied that they
posed serious dangers that justified defensive actions-includ-
ing force-that would otherwise lead to criminal liability. The
most commonly used metaphors involved dangers to public
health, the threat of war, and disasters-with the latter two hav-
ing implications for both persons and property. Each of these
'Justified" aggressive actions to combat the threats presented.
Moreover, the threats were "imminent," as the justifications of-
ten required. The danger began with the families' arrival. It
was immediate and extreme. Any delay in responding with nec-
essary force risked "destruction" of the neighborhood.
A. "SELVES DEFENSE"
White perpetrators often deemed their acts justified be-
cause of the threats that Black families presented. This at-
tempted analogy to the justifications of self-defense and defense
of others was built on a structure of assumptions about the rela-
tionship between race and place. The argument was that Blacks
represented a threat to the neighborhood or community-re-
flecting an implicit claim of "ownership" of their neighborhood.
There was a communitarian thrust to the argument, albeit an
exclusionary community that the members deemed was legiti-
mate and viable because of its racially exclusionary character.
When they spoke of preserving their community, they meant
protecting it against the taint of the presence of Black people.
They also regarded themselves as acting in an implicitly repre-
sentative capacity, self-appointed to attack on behalf of that
community. It was a self-righteous rhetoric that attempted to
justify otherwise criminal actions as being a matter of commu-
nity self-defense. 14'6
' This was a rhetorical "defense" that has no basis in any generally recognized
criminal law justification.
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The justifications of resistance also grew out of the rhetoric
whites used to describe Blacks' arrival. In south Boston, white
public housing residents characterized the assignment of Blacks
to developments there as "forced housing."'47 What they meant
was that they did not have any choice about who moved into
their neighborhood. So they deemed themselves entitled to re-
spond to "force" with force, a traditional justification defense."48
Anti-integration organizations used metaphors to convey
the nature, extent, and severity of the threat. Baltimore's
"Committee of Decent White Citizens Against Negro Invasion"
used military metaphors to cast African-Americans as hostile
foreign intruders who had to be defended against with the tools
of war.4 9 Black arrival was an "invasion"-the declaration of a
"race war."'15 From that perspective, the first Black family con-
stituted an advance war party trying to establish a beachhead
that would enable other invaders to follow. 5 ' Once having de-
fined the newcomers as aggressors, defending against them and
"' See MICHAEL PATRICK MCDONALD, ALL SouLs: A FAMILY STORY FROM SOUTHIE
(1999). The "force" existed regardless of Blacks' family structure. Whites viewed
Black single-parent families with no father present as posing a threat to the morality
and social stability of the neighborhood, while two-parent families posed a psycho-
logical and physical threat--especially to white women-because of the presence of
Black men.
148 The majority in the Pessy case gave voice to a variant of this claim. In a
strangely paradoxical statement, the Court said that the law could not "enforce com-
mingling of the two races." It was as if the absence of a mandatory segregation law
would "force" the races to commingle. As in south Boston, almost a century later,
what the Court must have been talking about was that without such a law, whites
might be "forced" to tolerate the presence of Blacks, some of whom might choose to
sit near them on trains. The law protected whites against that "force." Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1896). Without such protective laws post-Buchanan v.
Warley, which struck down a racial zoning ordinance, whites argued that they were
justified in using force to protect themselves against the "force" of Blacks moving into
their neighborhoods. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 61 (1917).
149 MEYER, supra note 2, at 19-20.
"0 Id. at 6, 110.
" Some sociologists used this metaphor in describing neighborhood change gen-
erally-"invasion and succession." Calvin P. Bradford & Leonard S. Rubinowitz, The
Urban-Suburban Investment-Disinvestment Process: Consequences for Older Neighborhoods,
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCL, November 1975, at 77. An Atlanta lawsuit by
whites against real estate brokers selling homes to Blacks carried out the military
metaphor by alleging that the defendants were trying to sell Blacks "strategically lo-
cated properties" to bring about "an encirclement of the city public park for white
persons... and the city public school for white children... " See KRUSE, supra note
34, at 101.
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sending them into retreat seemed to be the order of the day-a
natural and appropriate response to a threat to the commu-
nity's very survival. 52
In postwar Detroit, whites determined to defend their turf
against Black "invasions" and "penetrations.'' 3  Since force was
an appropriate means to repel the invaders, they came to view
their neighborhoods as "battlegrounds," and they plotted
strategies of resistance to protect their territory.' 4 They viewed
themselves as engaged in the moral equivalent of war, and they
seemed to have no doubt that it was a 'just war."
In another rhetorical ploy, the disease metaphor served as
an explanation for the need to expel the source of the disease. 55
Comparing Blacks' entry with a plague-the "Black plague"-
suggested the need for a public health response in order to pro-
tect the health and well-being of the community-in this case
the white community-against the spread of an epidemic.56
Presumably, the "disease" was spread by social contact, and it
was chronic and incurable. It could also have been spread by
sexual contact and passed on through the genes to the next
generation. The only chance to avoid the spread of the disease
was to root it out immediately, isolating the carrier from poten-
tial (white) victims. Quarantine served as a traditional public
health emergency measure to prevent a threatened epidemic.
Sending Black families back to their own neighborhoods pro-
vided an effective quarantine, since they would be among peo-
ple who already had the "disease" of Blackness and could not
152 In 1946, the leader of a white citizens' committee on Chicago's south side char-
acterized their effort as "we're fighting in the front lines here in Kenwood." As a re-
sult, he publicly applauded the bombing of a house in the neighborhood. MEYER,
supra note 2, at 89.
' SUGRUE, supra note 37, at 246.
154 Id.
.5 In a variation on the disease theme, white residents of a Chicago neighborhood
slated to receive public housing sued in the 1970s to block the housing because they
argued that poor Black people constituted an environmental threat-a form of pollu-
tion that would threaten the neighborhood with crime and deterioration. The fed-
eral court dismissed the case. Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Assn v. Lynn, 372 F.
Supp. 147 (ND Ill 1973), affd, 524 F2d 225 (7th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 424 U.S. 967
(1967). The idea of "reasonable racism" also plays in here. SeeJody D. Armour, Race
Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46
STAN. L. REV. 781, 787-88, 790, 792, 794-95 (1994).
"' MEYER, supra note 2, at 116.
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spread it to others. This metaphor treats the people themselves
as the disease, a form of dehumanization akin to a virus.
The arrival of Blacks also elicited disaster metaphors.
Communities were certainly entitled to take extreme defensive
measures against the lava of a volcano erupting,157 a "creeping
fire,"1 or a "moving wave."159
Whites also used hyperbolic statements to describe the
damage done to "their" community with the arrival of Black
residents, especially with the threat of racial turnover: "our
neighborhood was finished,"6 0 the neighborhood was "de-
stroyed,"'1 61 or "our community vanished."'62 In fact, it was white
people who had vanished. The neighborhood had only
changed. Buildings and people were still there.
At bottom, loss of status may have constituted the harm if
Blacks moved in. 163 The logic required a whole series of racist
assumptions: Blacks are inferior and of lower status; whites'
status is affected by the status of their neighbors; Blacks' pres-
ence as neighbors lowers whites' status ("reflected ignominy,"
the flip side of reflected glory); whites' status is determined by
how other whites perceive them; and race trumps any other
characteristics or accomplishments, so all Blacks-regardless of
their level of education, wealth, or achievement-reduce whites'
status. Residence in a safe and stable all white community, par-
ticularly for many first and second generation Americans, was a
principal badge of their social achievement, of their much cov-
eted middle-class status.1
64
157 Id. at 125.
'5 Id. at 128.
Id. at 75. In 1960, a concerned white homeowner complained, "Now a vast
flood of Negroes are coming East ward & threaten to swamp the area." See KRUSE, su-
pra note 34, at 168.
"' Id. at 115.
161 Id. at 173.
162 Id. at 181.
... See SUGRUE, supra note 37, at 213.
164 In places like Cleveland, Cincinnati, and Detroit, the leadership of the white re-
sistance consisted of homeowners with a tenuous hold on middle-class status. Their
insecurities led them to fear any association with lower status, such as Blacks. See
SUGRUE, supra note 37, at 241.
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A 1948 campaign statement by the mayor of the Detroit
suburb of Dearborn exemplifies these racist assumptions. He
argued that whites don't have to "live with niggers" because this
is a "free country."165  Thus, white citizens have the right to
choose where to live and with whom to associate-not Blacks.'f
One of the most serious threats to whites' status was misce-
genation, which many whites viewed as a particular risk associ-
ated with residential integration. Whites' fears ranged from
the "beast-rapist" myth18 to the fear of "amalgamation."6 9 Until
1967, when the Supreme Court decided Loving v. Virginia,
criminalizing miscegenation was not only considered constitu-
tional, it was also widespread. 7 °
B. DEFENSE OF PROPERTY
The argument about defense of property encompassed both
a concern about the depreciation of property values and the
threat to the use and enjoyment of "their" property. 7' There
165 MEYER, supra note 2, at 90.
"' The mayor might also have agreed with the majority in Plessy v. Ferguson that
Blacks don't have to live with whites either. Justice Harlan's dissent seems apposite
here. While the statute was symmetrical in form, he pointed out that the statute was
really about keeping Blacks out of the cars designated for whites, not vice versa.
167 See SUGRUE, supra note 37, at 217.
'68 DELANEY, supra note 76, at 129, 144.
... Id. at 137.
7 Loving v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Virginia was one of
sixteen states with anti-miscegenation statutes at the time. Id. at 5 n.6. Many whites
considered Blacks' moving into their neighborhoodas "crimes against nature." Worse
yet, Blacks' presence could lead to the ultimate crime against nature-miscegenation.
As late as the mid-1960s, the Virginia state court judge who convicted the Lovings un-
der the state's anti-miscegenation statute divined God's design as keeping the races at
great distances from each other, and certainly not married to each other. Ironically,
the judge seemed to view slavery as "unnatural" because it interfered with God's plan
to keep the races at great distance from each other:
Almighty God created the races white, Black, yellow, malay, and red, and he placed them
on separate continents. And but for the interference with his arrangement there would be
no cause for such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not in-
tend for the races to mix.
Id. at 3. This claim represented an effort to take the moral high ground. Acts de-
signed to expel Blacks that would otherwise constitute crimes became attempts to en-
force the moral values of the (white) community against wrongdoers committing
heinous offenses against those values and that community.
"' Their claim was not unlike that of gangs that view their "turf" as a space in
which they have a sufficient stake that entitles them to use otherwise criminal means
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was no claim that the physical property was threatened with
theft or damage-the traditional defense of property argu-
ments. Instead, whites argued that the value of their property
was threatened because of the presence of a Black family-not
to mention the presumed increased likelihood of further de-
cline in property values with additional Black families arriving
because of the presence of the initial family.17 2  Ironically,
Blacks' entry into previously all white neighborhoods often in-
creased property values because they were willing to pay more
than whites as a result of the discrimination that limited their
locational choices.
1 73
This declining property value scenario thus served as a basis
for justifying efforts to expel Black families, including initiatives
that would otherwise trigger criminal liability.174  Bombing or
setting fire to a Black family's home could be a way of protect-
ing white neighbors' property.' 1 The argument built on the
metaphor of infestation and fear of a spreading epidemic. As
the anti-integration mayor of Dearborn, Michigan said: "[E]very
time we hear of a Negro moving in we respond quicker than you
do to a fire," using the metaphor of spreading conflagration to
describe African-American presence.176
Even with that far-fetched reasoning, the defense of prop-
erty has limits. Defense of property may not serve as a defense
for the use of lethal force. 77 Some bombings did result in fatali-
to exclude others even though they'have no formal claim to ownership. See ALEX
KoTLowrrz, THERE ARE No CHILDREN HERE: THE STORY OF Two BoYs GROWING UP IN
THE OTHER AMERICA 41 (1992).
"' MEYER, supra note 2, at 27; see also SUGRUE, supra note 37, at 215.
175 This is often referred to as a "color tax" that Black pioneers paid. Id. at 11, 37,
77; see also CHARLES ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS: A STUDY OF PREJUDICE ON
HOUSING (1955); Leonard S. Rubinowitz & Elizabeth Trosman, Affirmative Action and
the American Dream: Implementing Fair Housing Policies in Federal Homeownership Programs,
74 Nw. U. L. REv. 491, 511-21 (1979). Black entrants were often more affluent than
their white neighbors. See SUGRUE, supra note 37, at 216.
"' Even if a defense of property rationale were applicable, it would be limited by
the proportionality requirement of that defense. Consequently, the tactics white rac-
ists used would have been unjustified because they were disproportionate to any harm
they sought to prevent.
175 Ironically, such actions could damage a neighborhood's reputation, thus lower-
ing property values throughout the area.
176 MEYER, supra note 2, at 122.
177 Model Penal Code § 3.06(3)(d) (1962).
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ties, for which defense of property could not have served as even
a formal defense.
C. NORM ENFORCEMENT
Whites sometimes viewed their actions as imposing a de-
served sanction against a gross, blatant violation of social norms
by Blacks. Whites claimed that bloodshed and riots were "pro-
voked by Negroes moving into... white sections."1 78 The social
norms of residential racial segregation were at the core of the
structure of twentieth century racial subordination. While those
norms had been enforced in some cities by law-through racial
zoning ordinances that the Supreme Court struck down in
1917-the eventual demise of such legislation did not under-
mine the underlying social norms.' 79 The norms were based in a
belief that Providence created racial barriers, and violence was
natural to prevent integration.8
While racial zoning laws were in effect, in places like Balti-
more and Louisville, Black movement into white areas was pro-
hibited.18 1 In some cases, violation of the ordinance resulted in
criminal liability.8 2 Blacks were arrested and indicted under
these ordinances, which subjected them to fines for relocating
across the color line.8
Segregation became deeply embedded as an accommoda-
tion to Black migration from rural areas in the South to south-
ern cities and from the South to the North and West. The
theory was that Blacks violated those social norms by their
physical presence, their occupancy, by "being there" in white
areas. Theirs was a status offense of RWB-residing while
Black.' 84 The offense was far more serious than DWB-driving
DELANEY, supra note 76, at 139.
79 See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
188 He also cites the use of metaphors about the perceived threat-"invasion,"
"danger," and "peril." DELANEY, supra note 76, at 134-40.
"' SeeMEYER, supra note 2, at 18, 24.
812 See id. at 19, 24, 109.
"' DELANEY, supra note 76, at 119. The crime might be characterized as "buying
while Black," or BWB, in current parlance.
"' See A.J. Ashworth, The Doctrine of Provocation, 35 CAMB. L.J. 292, 307-08 (1976)
(discussing this kind of situation where the victim is blamed: "he brought it on him-
self," "she asked for it," or "it served him right").
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while Black-which has received recent attention as an aspect of
racial profiling."" Residing while Black was more pervasive in
terms of the alleged resulting harms, and it was a continuing of-
fense with each day of living in the predominantly white neigh-
borhood. Even when it was not an actual crime, it was a blatant
violation of entrenched social norms.
Police and public officials sometimes effectively "deputized"
white citizens to assist in this enforcement process. 8 6 By their
actions or inaction, they permitted private citizens to patrol the
"color line" to keep Blacks from crossing it and moving into
white communities. In those circumstances, white citizens
viewed themselves as entitled to use force to implement the
government's police powers.
D. DEFENSE OF COUNTRY
During the McCarthy era, whites also sounded patriotic
themes in justification of their resistance to Black entry. They
characterized the movement of Blacks into their neighborhood
as an effort by communists to foment racial tensions, as part of
their plan to overthrow the government.'87 Thus, the apparent
crimes of resistance really constituted patriotic efforts to protect
the country against the communist conspiracy. 8
Meyer may have inadvertently given some credence to this
claim. The most prominent example of the "communist con-
spiracy" strategy was the 1950s Louisville prosecutor's claim that
white and Black communists had conspired to dynamite a Black
family's house to foment racial tension. Anne Braden's account
of this episode in The Wall Between details the way officials
"' See generally, KENNETH MEEKS, DRIVING WHILE BLACK (2000) (detailing the places
and ways that racial profiling takes place and strategies for resisting it).
186 DELANEY, supra note 76, at 101, 184. In late 1946, the Columbians in Atlanta
announced that in order to keep Blacks out of white neighborhoods, they would "ar-
rest" Blacks present in a white part of the city. Violators would be "turned over to the
police, beaten with Blackjacks, and locked up for being drunk." However, the chief
of police intervened to stop the Columbians from "assisting" the department, insist-
ing that his officers would keep the peace in the city. See KRUSE, supra note 34, at 29-
32.
187 See MEYER, supra note 2, at 125, 137, 138; SUGRUE, supra note 37, at 226.
188 MEYER, supra note 2, at 137. In Atlanta, the Klan defined fighting communism
and white supremacy-especially preventing Black invasions of white neighbor-
hoods-the twin pillars of its program. See KRuSE, supra note 34, at 48.
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shifted from a focus on white neighbors and their allies as prob-
able perpetrators to suggesting that she and her husband (who
were white) bought the house in a white community on behalf
of a Black family (the Wades) as part of a communist conspir-189
acy. While Meyer did not reject Braden's claim that these
were trumped up racist charges, he did not seem to take it seri-
ously, either. 190 The evidence seems quite clear that the bomb-
ing of the Wades' home was the culmination of an extended
and escalating campaign of racist attacks conducted by white
neighbors and their allies-not a communist plot to foment ra-
cial tensions.1 9'
V. THE VICTIMS
Perpetrators targeted a wide variety of victims. These were
men, women, and children-celebrities, professionals, members
of the working class, and poor families.92 Their race and their
movement into predominantly white areas constituted the basis
for victimizing them. The crimes caused serious physical, finan-
cial, and psychological injuries.
A. IDENTITY: RACE AND CLASS
Just as education, status, and wealth did not protect Blacks
from racial profiling and myriad other racial insults at the dawn
of the twenty-first century, those achievements did not protect
earlier generations of Blacks from housing-related racial
crimes.'9' Many of the victims were middle- and upper middle-
class homeowners residing in neighborhoods of single-family
homes. Perpetrators targeted doctors in Detroit, Atlanta, Dal-
las, Birmingham, and Long Beach;'94 a lawyer in Baltimore; 95
189 See BRADEN, supra note 76, at 140-41, 151-52, 168-82.
190 Braden's account is necessarily self-serving, since she and her husband bought
the house; but Meyer does not provide any explanation for his skepticism about the
accuracy of her version of the story. See id. at 138.
191 Id.
Perpetrators also sometimes targeted whites who sold or rented to Blacks as well
as real estate agents that facilitated such transactions.
... Euis COSE, THE RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS (1993); FEAGIN & SIKES, supra note
50.
194 MEYER, supra note 2, at 37, 38 (Detroit); id. at 57 (Atlanta); id. at 59 (Dallas); id.
at 110 (Birmingham); id. at 129 (Long Beach).
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ministers in Chicago, Atlanta, and Birmingham;' 9 business peo-
ple in Dallas, Louisville, and Tilghman Island, Maryland;
9 7
teachers in Los Angeles and Richmond;'98 and scientists in Los
Angeles and Oak Park, Illinois (the renowned chemist Percy jul-
ian). 9
Nor were celebrities exempt. Race trumped everything else.
The renowned singer Nat King Cole and the baseball star Willie
Mays were victimized at their homes in Los Angeles and San
Francisco, respectively.00 When Nat King Cole's family moved
into a white L.A. neighborhood in 1948, they were first offered a
buy out. When they declined to sell, neighborhood intimida-
tors burned the words "nigger" and "nigger heaven" on their
front lawn."' In 1957, a long campaign of intimidation against a
white homeowner who planned to sell a home to Willie and
Marguerite Mays almost prevented him from selling to them;
but counter-pressures from a civic organization, the media, and
the mayor ultimately led him to make the sale.2 2  Shortly after
they moved into the house, someone threw a rock through the
front window.0 3 In 1965, the professional basketball star Bill
Russell experienced an attack on the other coast.204 Criminals
broke into his home in the mostly white Boston suburb of Read-
ing, destroyed all his trophies, trashed the house, and left feces
in his and his wife's bed.2 5
195 Id. at 18.
"6 Id. at 89 (Chicago); id. at 103 (Atlanta); id. at 107 (Birmingham).
'9 Id. at 61-62 (Dallas); id. at 138 (Louisville); id., at 219 (Tilghman Island).
Id. at 76, 127 (Los Angeles); id. at 112 (Richmond).
... Id. at 76 (Los Angeles--engineer and teacher); id. at 118 (Oak Park).
900 Id. at 95 (Nat King Cole); id. at 131 (Willie Mays).
201 Id. at 96.
292 Id. at 131.
203 The realtor who had represented the owner refused to participate in the trans-
action because he thought that doing so would be devastating to his business. Id. at
131.
... The attack came in Russell's ninth year with the Boston Celtics, when he was an
established star who had led his team to eight.National Basketball Association cham-
pionships. When he had arrived in Boston almost a decade earlier, the family had
experienced difficulty finding a place to live. His subsequent stardom did not make
his home a safe refuge. The source for this background information is ProfessorJon
Entin, a life-long Boston Celtics fan.
... Russell's daughter Karen Russell provided a very graphic depiction of this epi-
sode:
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Successful Black actresses Hattie McDaniel, Louise Beavers,
and Ethel Waters were defendants in a 1940s civil suit in which
white plaintiffs argued that they had violated a racially restrictive
covenant in the Beverly Hills neighborhood in which they
lived.206 The actresses won, but the subsequent violence against
Blacks moving into predominantly white and relatively wealthy
neighborhoods in Los Angeles demonstrated that whether the
law was on their side or not, African-Americans were extremely
vulnerable residents.
20 7
Low income Blacks relocating in white areas were also vic-
tims of racial violence. When local public housing agencies
sought to integrate their program by assigning Black families to
historically white developments, white residents and their sup-
porters resisted with threats and violence. The Chicago experi-
ence epitomizes this phenomenon. In 1946, the Chicago
Housing Authority (CHA) adopted a policy of non-
discrimination in the assignment of tenants to its develop-
ments .2 A white mob smashed windows and tipped over cars
when CHA moved Black families into a white-area develop-
ment.2 9 The resistance persisted until the families left the de-
velopment, a month later.21 The next year, five thousand whites
One night we came home from a three-day weekend and found we had been robbed. Our
house was in shambles and "NIGGA" was spray-painted on the walls. The burglars had
poured beer on the pool table and ripped up the felt. They had broken into my father's
trophy case and smashed most of the trophies. I was petrified and shocked at the mess;
everyone was very upset. The police came, and after a while, they left. It was then that my
parents pulled back their bedcovers to discover that the burglars had defecated in their
bed.
Karen Russell, Growing Up With Privilege and Prejudice, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1987, at 23.
She also noted the way in which the local police tried to deny the existence of racist
crimes: "Every time the Celtics went out on the road, vandals would come and tip
over our garbage cans. My father went to the police to complain. The police told
him that raccoons were responsible, so he asked where he could apply for a gun per-
mit. The raccoons never came back." Id.
206 MEYERt, supra note 2, at 77.
20, See id. at 76.
201 See discussion infra notes 322-30 and accompanying text describing the Boston
Housing Authority experience of the 1990s.
20 MEYER, supra note 2, at 90.
210 Id.
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demonstrated in order to keep Blacks out of another CHA
white-area development.
21'
Moreover, many Black families moving into white areas suf-
fered repeated victimization. Since perpetrators' goals contem-
plated expelling families from the community, the first attacks
were not necessarily the last ones. If families stayed, they could
experience what might be called "serial victimization." 212 Resis-
tance sometimes escalated-from telephone threats to bombs,
for example. The experience of the Wilson family in Detroit in
1955 provides a dramatic case in point.213 When they bought a
house in a predominantly white neighborhood, their neighbors
"launched a five-month siege." 214  Right before the Wilsons
moved in, "someone broke into the house, turned on all the
faucets, blocked the kitchen sink, flooded the basement, and
spattered Black paint on the walls and floors. Later that day, af-
ter the Wilsons cleaned up the mess and left, vandals broke all
the front windows in the house. 2 5 When the family moved in,
racists greeted them with more rocks thrown through the win-
dows and at the house, and angry, anonymous phone calls.16
Over the next two months, the attacks persisted, including eggs,
rocks, and bricks thrown at the windows, paint of various colors
thrown at the house, snakes put in the basement, and salt
poured on the lawn.1 7
While the Wilsons' ordeal was not uncommon, in other in-
stances families' determination to stay in their home led to a
decline in resistance over time.2 18 Nevertheless, the risk and real-
211 Id.
212 See discussion supra pp. 354-55 (the timing of the crimes). There have also been
examples of multiple vicitims in the same area. When Blacks started moving into
homes on a white block in Atlanta in the 1920s, whites 'Just started blowing up,
throwing bombs on people's front porches and through the front windows, in their
yards." See KRUSE, supra note 34, at 6.
211 SUGRUE, supra note 37, 232-34.
214 m
21 Id. In an even more violent series of crimes, in the early 1950s Atlanta whites set
fire to a home twice. After the Black owners made costly repairs, racists dynamited
the home. SeeKRuSE, supra note 34, at 114.
216 Id.
217 Id.
211 See MEYER, supra note 2, at 17-18.
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ity of multiple, ongoing victimization added to the toll these
crimes took on their victims.
21 9
B. IMPACTS
Housing-related racial crimes had physical, financial, and
psychological impacts on their victims. Individual families were
usually isolated pioneers who bore the full brunt of these
crimes, and the harms they suffered were often severe and long
lasting. Moreover, indirect injuries affected many other
Blacks-those living in the area as well as those contemplating
such moves.
1. Physical Impacts
The physical impacts of whites' crimes fell on Black indi-
viduals as well as their property. In several instances, racial vio-
lence resulted in the death of one or more family members.
Between 1917 and 1921, fifty-eight bombings occurred in Chi-
cago, resulting in the death of two Blacks and injuries to several
people of both races.22 ° In 1944, two Black children, ages seven
and twelve, died in the firebombing of their home in a white
Chicago neighborhood. 2' In 1945, whites blew up the home of
a Black family that had moved into a white neighborhood in the
Los Angeles area, killing the husband and wife and their young
., .,, 222
children.
Arson and bombings almost always presented the possibility,
if not the probability, of serious injury or death for family mem-
bers and guests. While it is not clear how frequently physical in-
jury occurred, certainly the reign of terror wrought by mobs and
anonymous aggression must have created a constant sense of
great danger for many African-American entrants.
In terms of property damage, some victims experienced de-
struction of all or part of their homes and their contents, often
from bombs or arson. In 1944, arsonists destroyed the house of
,9 This might be thought of as the dark side of ongoing interracial relations-the
mirror-image of the "contact hypothesis" that asserts that racial attitudes will improve
with increasing contacts between people of different races of equal status.
220 MEYER, supra note 2, at 34.
"' Id. at 89.
2 Id. at 77.
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one Black Chicago family and firebombed another. 3 The late
1940s witnessed the dynamiting and firebombing of several
Black families' homes in Birmingham, Alabama. 24 In 1951,
there were eleven house bombings and six "mysterious fires" in
a racially contested area of Dallas.25
Meyer generally emphasizes the fact of the bombings rather
than the nature and extent of the damage to the home. Anne
Braden's Louisville account of the Wade family's experience
makes the picture of destruction more concrete and specific:
The worst of the explosion had been on the side of the house opposite
where they [the owner and a friend] were sitting. Apparently, dynamite
had been placed in the air vent where the grating was broken out six
weeks before when the window was smashed. This was the side where
the two bedrooms and bathroom were. These rooms were virtually de-
stroyed. Huge holes were blown in the floor and some of the flooring
boards crashed through the ceiling. In the rest of the house, windows
were broken and floors were buckled by the impact.
22 6
Other property damage ranged from flooding to garbage
piled on the front lawn. 7 That was in addition to broken win-
dows and other acts of vandalism.
These attacks tapped into the history of Blacks being dispos-
sessed, literally, from property ownership throughout slavery
and through legal maneuverings in the agricultural economy
and debt peonage.2 28 That history made property ownership,
generally, and home ownership, specifically, that much more
precious for African-Americans. Thus, these property crimes
had an even greater impact than would otherwise be the case.
223 Id. at 89.
221 Id. at 106-07.
22 Id. at 112.
226 BRADEN, supra note 76, at 138. An Atlanta explosion five years earlier "blew out
the windows, crumbled the plaster walls, and shot a wooden plank fifty feet down the
street, shattering a neighbor's window and covering him with shards of glass." See
KRUSE, supra note 34, at 67.
... Meyer, supra note 2, at 125.
2 See A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL PoLrIIcs AND
PREsuMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCEss 85-86 (1996).
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2. Financial Costs
Financial costs accompanied the property damage. Families
had to pay for repairs and household items destroyed that were
not covered by insurance because of deductibles or maximum
limits on coverage. Other out-of-pocket expenses included the
cost of staying someplace else while repairs were made, as well
as the costs of additional security measures designed to protect
against future crimes, such as installing alarm systems, barring
windows, and acquiring, training, and taking care of watch-
dogs. '2
With the homes that were completely destroyed, there were
costs associated with finding a new home, such as search costs,
the costs of securing a new mortgage, and moving expenses.
Even when the home could have been repaired, the threat of
future attacks or the traumatic effect on children or other fam-
ily members led some Black families to relocate, with the atten-
dant financial costs.
230
Moreover, insurance companies sometimes canceled poli-
cies or increased premiums.5 ' In the extreme case when no in-
surance company would insure the home because of the risks
involved, families that stayed anyway became self-insurers with
the very serious financial risks that entailed.
With both total destruction and partial damage, there was
also the loss of items with sentimental value or other kinds of
personal significance. For example, it is difficult to place a
monetary value on professional basketball star Bill Russell's tro-
phies and awards that home invaders destroyed. Thus, along
with the strictly financial costs, there were associated emotional
and psychological impacts.
Meyer, supra note 2, at 107, 128.
220 Id. at 45, 76; see also SUGRUE, supra note 37, at 255.
2 Id. at 33. In The Wall Between, Anne Braden describes the problems the Wades
faced when the insurance company originally slated to insure their home declined to
do so once it became clear that there was a serious risk that the house would be de-
stroyed. BRADEN, supra note 76, at 104.
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3. Psychological Harms
Moreover, the threats and attacks caused psychological
harm to the victims and to other Black families.2  The victims
experienced emotional trauma.2 33  The stress of the constant
harassment that the Wilson family experienced in their Detroit
neighborhood was so great that their five-year-old son began
having "nervous attacks," waking up in the middle of the night
complaining that he felt like snakes were crawling all over him.
When a psychologist advised the family that their son might
have permanent emotional injuries as a result of the relentless
racist attacks, they moved out.
234
The trauma was perhaps even greater for first-time home-
buyers like the Wades, who bought a house in a white suburb of
Louisville in 1954.235 They did an extensive search for a home
before they asked the Bradens, a white couple, to front for them
and buy the house. They moved in with great anticipation, only
to have their hopes dashed by threats, harassment, and, ulti-
mately, by the bombing of their house.236 Moreover, the psycho-
logical cost for the Wade family and others encountering such
resistance mounted over time. Once the threats started, there
was constant fear of violence-so much so in the Wades' case
that friends and supporters volunteered to stand guard at
night.27 The bombing itself produced psychological trauma for
the family. It was a "violation" that is far more serious even than
the "violation" that people talk about after a home invasion or
burglary. The attack cost them their privacy and autonomy and
signaled to them that there was no "safe haven," no place of
refuge for them in that community. This kind of attack is likely
.2 Sugrue notes that "homes were symbolic extensions of the self, of the family"
and that an attack "was a direct challenge to a family's privacy and security." SUGRUE,
supra note 37, at 254.
253 BRADEN, supra note 76, at 220.
214 SUGRUE, supra note 37, at 233. Mr. Wilson also had a heart condition, which was
aggravated by the stress. The experience and departure of the Wilsons also effectively
deterred other Black families from moving into the neighborhood.
2 See discussion infra note 76 and accompanying text.
236 MEYER, supra note 2, at 137-38. For an in-depth account of the Braden-Wade
experience, see generally BRADEN, supra note 76.
117 See BRADEN, supra note 76, at 116-22.
2002] RACIAL COFLICTINAMERICANNEIGHBORHOODS 385
to have intense short-term effects and lingering, long-term ones,
as well.
23s
Cross burnings had particularly powerful psychological ef-
fects because of their historical symbolism of white supremacists
and the extreme threats that they conjure up of the aftermath
of cross burning.3 9 Similarly, threatening notes signed "KKK"
or the use of the KKK initials as part of the vandalism of prop-
erty heightened the effect on residents because these symbols
resurrected images of the long history of violence and intimida-
tion of African-Americans.
At the same time, the psychological impacts were not lim-
ited to the immediate victims. Racial attacks also had a chilling
effect on other African-American families who might otherwise
have chosen to move to that community.24 ° The very large,
highly organized campaign of Detroit's whites to resist Black en-
try in the postwar period deterred tens of thousands of Blacks
from moving into predominantly white neighborhoods for fear
of encountering harassment and physical injury. In such in
stances, the decision-making process itself was likely to generate
substantial stress, and the decision not to move could produce a
sense of frustration, fear, and failure, along with relief.
VI. LAW ENFORCEMENT: THE POLICE AND THE CRIMINALJUSTICE
SYSTEM
Since Meyer focuses on the fact of discrimination rather
than the official response to it, his accounts of law enforcement
"' While the account of the Wades' ordeal is through the eyes of Anne Braden
rather than the Wades themselves, there are indications of the impact on the Wades'
lives. In addition to the loneliness it caused them, it changed the meaning of the
house for them. It had become a cause and a symbol, and "had ceased to be a
home." See id. at 139. The violence that pervaded Black families' experience integrat-
ing Boston's public housing in the 1960s took a heavy psychological toll on them.
Many reported persistent nervousness and inability to sleep because of the fear of be-
ing victimized. See VALE, SALVAGING PUBLIC HOUSING, supra note 69, ch. 2.
239 FEAGIN & SIKES, Supra note 50, at 21.
240 A family was going to move to the Chicago suburb of Cicero until friends per-
suaded them that they faced great danger in doing so. RUBINOWITZ ET AL., supra note
13, at 57. Cicero's reputation for racial exclusion was based partly on the 1951 fire-
bombing of an apartment house when a Black family moved into the building.
MEYER, supra note 2, at 118-19.
41 SUGRUE, supra note 37, at 233-34.
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are sketchy at best.242 Even so, it seems clear that the system did
little to prevent, pursue, prosecute, or punish this kind of inter-
racial criminal activity. 43 In fact, these criminal acts were often
consistent with the dominant (white) local morality and norms,
thus making punishment seem inappropriate to the white
power structure. Retribution appeared to be unnecessary since
there were no 'Just deserts" to be had. The part of the commu-
nity that was wronged did not count, for purposes of community
condemnation. Without police initiatives and arrests, there was
no chance of punishment. Without punishment, there was no
reason to expect either specific or general deterrence, and so
the attacks could proceed unimpeded by the imposition and
impact of the criminal law.
244
242 Most of Meyer's accounts are fragmentary and from a single source. When
Meyer says nothing about arrests or prosecutions, it is not clear whether there were
no arrests, the source Meyer relies on had no information on the subject, or Meyer
simply chose not to discuss it. Any efforts to discern patterns of police response must
therefore be very tentative.
243 This failure is consistent with the failure of the criminal justice system in other
racially motivated crimes. Thousands of lynchings went unpunished and undeterred
for decades. Perpetrators in notorious crimes such as the murder of civil rights
leader Medgar Evers were not successfully prosecuted for many years. The most
dramatic examples of nonfeasance were in the South, but as Meyer's accounts sug-
gest, the North was not fundamentally different in its approach to inter-racial crimes.
The detailed accounts of other failures of the system provide an additional basis for
extrapolating beyond Meyer's sketchy accounts in the housing-related context.
HERBERT SHAPIRO, WHITE VIOLENCE AND BLACK RESPONSE: FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO
MONTGOMERY (1988). As Stephen Carter suggests, victimhood is socially constructed
and depends on the social context in which the claim is made. Stephen L. Carter,
When Victims Happen to Be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420 (1988). The dominant culture in
many communities conferred the status of victim on the white residents who lost
something because of the threat presented by the unwanted and unexpected pres-
ence of Black neighbors. It was race and racism that determined the respective iden-
tities of the transgressors and victims. The transgressors were the Black families who
moved in, and their victimizing acts were those very moves. Whites' actions in re-
sponse thus constituted sanctions aimed at punishing and deterring those transgres-
sors and deterring other potential transgressors. If the government failed to
intervene to prevent this victimization of whites, they had to protect themselves. That
dominant culture also made it difficult to understand the claims of Black families to
victim status in these encounters. As long as Blacks were perceived as the offenders
by harming the community by their presence, it was the white residents who had the
appropriate claim of victimization. Of course, this view ignores the whole context of
this country's continuing history of racial oppression. Instead, it perpetuates that his-
tory by providing whites with a rhetorical justification for continuing to victimize
Blacks.
... Police exhibited similar behavior in non-housing related racial encounters.
MEYER, supra note 2, at 44. In Race Riot, William Tuttle cites the grand jury investiga-
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This apparent lack of enforcement exemplifies the reality of
racial disparities in the realm of crime and punishment. Non-
enforcement meant letting these and other crimes by whites
against Blacks go unpunished, while the response even to alle-
gations of Black-on-white crime was, by contrast, extremely ag-
gressive, leading to trials like that of the Scottsboro boys for
alleged rape, or even lynchings.245  Blacks' property, physical
and psychological well being, and lives were further depreciated
by the failure to investigate, arrest, prosecute, and punish white
offenders. The fact that the house was now in Black hands
made the criminal justice system view it and its occupants as less
valuable than previously, which was reflected in the frequent
failure to bring perpetrators to justice.
Moreover, failures to enforce the law facilitated the per-
petuation of whites' ability to subordinate Blacks by keeping
them "in their place." As the entity with a monopoly on the le-
gitimate use of force, the state effectively delegated that power
to private individuals through its inaction. 46 Many of these ac-
counts portray the state as condoning or even supporting or aid-
ing the use of private white violence, thus de facto
decriminalizing it.
247
At the top of the law enforcement "funnel," police made
few efforts to apprehend and arrest perpetrators. That passivity
also allowed perpetrators to remain "unknown"-at least offi-
cially, since the conspiracy of silence sometimes included the
tion of the 1919 Chicago riot, saying that "white officers were grossly unfair in making
arrests." TurrLE, supra note 35, at 158. He also notes that in the course of the four-
teen days of the riot, police arrested Blacks at twice the rate of whites even though
Blacks sustained far more injuries. He finds evidence that police were apathetic in
aiding Blacks who were victims of racially motivated violence, and that the police ap-
peared to be co-conspirators with those committing the violence. Id. at 64.
.45 See ALLEN D. GRIMSHAW, RACiAL VIOLENCE IN THE UNITED STATES (1969); SHAPIRO,
supra note 8; see also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Norris v. Alabama, 294
U.S. 587 (1935).
246 DELANEY, supra note 76, at 33.
247 MEYER, supra note 2, at 107 (bombings were not "truly adequately investigated
because the detective division was unconcerned about crimes against Black prop-
erty"); id. at 117 ("Chicago police were present throughout [an attack on an apart-
ment by a mob of 800], but they did nothing to stop it"); id. at 126 ("Five carloads of
police arrived at the scene [of a mob trying to force a family out], but instead of con-
trolling the demonstrators, one policeman disarmed [the victim], and the rest stood
by idly watching").
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police and other public officials. Prosecutors prosecuted very
few of those arrested, proceeded to few trials, secured still fewer
convictions, and the seemingly rare punishment that the courts
meted out reflected their view of the trivial nature of these of-
fenses.
Even the more positive examples of the system responding
to these crimes leave much to be desired. When the Myers fam-
ily moved into Levittown, Pennsylvania in 1957, white neighbors
gathered to try to drive them out.248 Mobs numbering as many
as four hundred people threw stones, smashed windows, and
burned a cross on the family's lawn. Police tried to quell the
violence and block off the neighborhood; but local police were
overwhelmed and state troopers intervened. For more than a
week, whites protested outside the house, and police tried to
disperse the crowds-unlike local law enforcement officials in
many other comparable situations elsewhere. On several nights,
police wielded riot clubs and arrested perpetrators. However,
when all was said and done, only seven of the perpetrators were
indicted. They were convicted of disturbing the peace and
other minor offenses-not a model of aggressive law enforce-
ment or effective administration of the criminal justice system.249
A. THE POLICE
Local, state, and federal law enforcement officials re-
sponded to these situations in a variety ways. Some supported
white resistance by joining forces with the mob, trying to per-
suade Black families to move out in order to restore peace after
they "caused" the disturbances, failing to show up at the scene
when called, or standing idly by as passive observers in the face
of a legal duty to act. Others intervened to disperse a mob or
stop criminal activity such as rock throwing, often with pro
forma or totally ineffective efforts. Still others carried out the
traditional police responsibilities of investigating, apprehending
... MEYER, supra note 2, at 148; see DELANEY, supra note 76, at 106-07 (discussing po-
lice stepping in to prevent violence by whites).
249 MEYER, supra note 2, at 147-48.
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suspects, and making arrests-usually on minor charges such as
disturbing the peace.250
Overall, the reports reflect a sketchy but consistent picture
of chronic under-enforcement of the law-inaction and ineffec-
tive action, and sometimes even police complicity in housing-
related crimes. They show many police officers as sympathetic
to, if not openly supportive of, the white perpetrators. Police
officers often shared the white community's perspective on the
need to remove the "threat," stem the "invasion," and restore
peace and order by getting Black families out of their home. In
many instances, the police were enforcing deeply embedded so-
cial norms-customs that were often more powerful than the
law.
In 1941, after a series of bombings greeted Blacks' entry
into white Dallas neighborhoods, the police chief doubled the
number of officers investigating the incidents; but they ques-
tioned few suspects and arrested no one. 51 In other cities, po-
lice told Black residents that they did not have the resources to
protect them from mobs, urged them to move out, or stood by
while mobs terrorized them.2 52
In a number of instances, police intentionally refused to ar-
rest whites that they believed to be perpetrators of these crimes.
In 1925, Detroit police arrived but did little as whites threw
bricks through the windows and ripped tiles from the roof of
the home of a Black family that had moved into a white neigh-
borhood.253 Thirty years later, Detroit police repeated that non-
performance when they were assigned to protect the Wilson
250 Police may have been criminally liable in some of these cases either through
their acts or their omissions when they had a duty to act because of their official posi-
tion and contractual obligations. It is uncertain whether any police officers were
prosecuted in any of these cases. In other cases, police officers may have exercised
their discretion to disperse the crowd rather than make arrests for minor offenses
and risk an escalation of the crowd's hostile actions.
251 MEYER, supra note 2, at 61-62. The Dallas mayor, city planner, and city manager
all participated in efforts to persuade African-Americans not to move into homes they
had purchased in white neighborhoods.
2 See id. at 37, 117, 126.
2" Id. at 37.
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home."4 Many of the continuing attacks on the house took
place while police officers sat in their cars nearby.
Similarly, in 1949, Chicago police stood idly by as a crowd of
eight hundred whites threw stones, smashed windows, chanted
"Burn the Black bastard out," and threw a flaming rag into a
building into which a Black couple had just moved.2 55 The fire
almost destroyed the building.
When the Clark family tried to move into an apartment in
the all white Chicago suburb of Cicero in 1951, white protestors
greeted them.56 When the Cicero police arrived on the scene,
they sided with the demonstrators and told the Clarks to get out
of Cicero. 257  The chief of police forcibly removed the family
from the community.
25 a
In the 1960s, Black Boston public housing residents re-
ported that the police were unresponsive to their complaints of
racial harassment. Initially, the police referred residents to the
259public housing managers.
As the incidents escalated in number and severity, the Hous-
ing Authority hired additional police to patrol at night and to
investigate reported incidents and 'apprehend suspects. How-
ever, police often turned on their sirens as they arrived at a de-
velopment in response to an incident. Consequently, few
254 SUGRUE, supra note 37, at 232.
211Id. at 117. Also, when the Chicago Housing Authority began after World War II
to permit a small number of Black families to move into developments in white com-
munities, violence by whites ensued. According to Elizabeth Wood, the head of CHA
at the time, the police disappeared when the violence began. Fred Lazin, Public
Housing in Chicago, 1963-1971: Gautreaux vs. Chicago Housing Authority: A Case
Study of the Co-optation of a Federal Agency by its Local Constituency 58 (1973)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file with the University of
Chicago Library).
256 MEYER, supra note 2, at 118; Roy Moseley, Oh, The Times, They Ain't a
'Changin' 3 (1992) (unpublished paper) (on file with authors). In a still more out-
rageous incident than the Cicero episode, in 1960 the Atlanta police "chastised"
whites who bombed a Black family's home for failing to do an adequate job, even
though the dynamite tore the siding off the house and blew out part of the founda-
tion. A police officer reportedly said, "Why in the god damn hell did those people
waste one stick of dynamite, and why didn't they wait until after 1 A.M.? .... They
should have waited until later and blown the whole god damn house up." See KRUSE,
supra note 34, at 160.
257 See MEYER, supra note 2, at 118.
258 Id.
219 SeeVALE, SALVAGING PUBLIC HOUSING, supra note 69.
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perpetrators were caught and prosecuted. As a result of this
combination of non-responsiveness and deception or ineptness,
many Black residents simply did not report incidents to the po-
lice-officials who they thought of more as members of the
white community in south Boston than as their protectors from
racist attacks. 2 °
Police support of white perpetrators even included lying on
the witness stand, as in the high profile Sweet case in Detroit.26'
In 1925, Dr. Ossian Sweet and his wife moved into a home in a
white neighborhood. Shortly thereafter, a mob of 2000 whites
gathered. Police apparently did little to control the mob.
When whites smashed windows with stones and fired shots into
the home, Dr. Sweet and several of his guests fired back into the
crowd and hit two men, killing one. The public response was
hostile to the Black men but not to the mob that threatened
them. The mayor and the district attorney's office blamed the
Sweets and their friends for inciting the mob that led to this
tragedy. The police arrested a dozen Sweet family members and
friends and charged them with first-degree murder. Prosecu-
tors alleged that the defendants had fired shots without provo-
cation and the crime was consequently premeditated murder.
Police officials' lies to the prosecutors about the incident served
as the basis for those allegations. Police witnesses testified that
no mob had assembled and that no one had thrown stones or
fired shots at the house.262 Clarence Darrow, who represented
the defendants, demonstrated that prosecution witnesses were
coached to perjure themselves, and he got some witnesses to
admit what really happened that night. 6
260 id.
161 See MEYER, supra note 2, at 39.
2' See id. at 41.
26 Id. The first trial ended in a mistrial. Darrow prevailed in a second trial in
which Dr. Sweet's brother Henry was the defendant. But the years of imprisonment
and intimidation had already taken their toll on the Sweets, and Mrs. Sweet died from
the tuberculosis she contracted in prison. Id. at 45. The hostility of the police and
public officials to their case, including the police perjury, spoke volumes about the
extent to which African-Americans were able to experience the full benefits of prop-
erty holding and to secure justice when victimized by racial crimes. Several years
later, Detroit police responded to threats, gunshots, and vandalism aimed at another
Black family that moved into a white neighborhood by suggesting that the family
move out of the area. Id. at 38-45.
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These police abuses amounted to a kind of "double victimi-
zation" for Black movers. In addition to encountering civilian
perpetrators, they were victimized by those who were supposed
to protect them from criminals.
This picture of police animosity or laxity contrasts with the
aggressive law enforcement tactics used when Blacks seemed to
threaten white interests, as illustrated by the arrests and jailing
of thousands of peaceful Black civil rights demonstrators, pri-
marily in the South but in other parts of the country as well.' 64
When Father James Groppi led open housing marchers into
Milwaukee's ethnic neighborhoods in 1967, the police arrested
the priest and other marchers for violating the mayor's prohibi-
tion on nighttime demonstrations.2 65 Those arrests and others
for trespass, disturbing the peace, and other alleged offenses in-
volved activities that were arguably lawful and, at their worst, did
not compare in seriousness to whites' housing-related offenses
that the police often let stand.266
B. PROSECUTORS
At their best, prosecutors vigorously prosecuted alleged
perpetrators. Far more often, it seems, they did nothing. At
their worst, they engaged in "victim blaming" with prosecutions
of the Black victims or their supporters.
Prosecutors sought and obtained some indictments against
white perpetrators. In Dallas, after eleven bombings and a half
dozen suspicious fires in transitional neighborhoods, a grand
jury handed down nearly a dozen indictments in 1951, although
it failed to indict the presumed ringleader of the campaign. 
267
However, none of those brought to trial were convicted. t s
Also in 1951, a federal grand jury indicted seven local offi-
cials in the Chicago suburb of Cicero for conspiracy after they
supported whites' efforts to expel a Black family from the com-
211 See TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954-1963;
734-45, 763-88 (1988).
215 MEYER, supra note 2, at 192.
... At the same time, there are some accounts of police stepping in to prevent vio-
lence by whites against Black entrants. SeeDELANEY, supra note 76, at 107.
267 MEYER, supra note 2, at 112-13.
268 Id.
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munity.269 The mob's resistance culminated in the firebombing
and gutting of the apartment building. Four of the local offi-
cials were convicted, but their convictions were reversed on ap-
peal.27 °
However, prosecutors sometimes took actions reflecting the
racial views of their white constituents. Three decades after De-
troit's Sweet case, a similarly perverse prosecution occurred. In
1954, the Louisville prosecutor apparently ignored the fact that
a white neighbor had all but confessed to bombing a Black fam-
ily's home along with some white accomplices, turning instead
to prosecute the whites that bought the home as surrogates on
behalf of the Black family.27' The prosecutor alleged that these
whites were communists seeking to foment racial conflict, and
that they duped the Black family into purchasing the home with
the intent of bombing it and throwing suspicion on residents of
the white suburb. 72 This is a picture of a criminal justice system
constrained by culture, custom, and politics, at a time when
both racism and McCarthyism held sway.273
C. THE COURTS
Limited information is available on the role of the courts in
the seemingly rare instances where prosecutions took place. 74
2
1
9 Id. at 119.
270 Id.
See BRADEN, supra note 76, at 168.
This is the version of the events Anne Braden presents in The Wall Between.
Braden and her husband purchased the house on behalf of the Black family and were
later prosecuted on the theory involving the communist conspiracy. In discussing the
Louisville episode, Meyer seems quite skeptical of Braden's account, but does not ex-
plain why. MEYER, supra note 2, at 137-38.
273 The response mirrored many of the accusations that Martin Luther King was a
communist, and the proof was that he was stirring up Blacks, who were otherwise per-
fectly satisfied with their lot in life and their treatment by whites. See BRADEN, supra
note 76, at 468-69. As a result, legal norms were not enforced, giving way to more
powerful cultural norms of racism and anti-communism. Local elected officials also
sometimes reflected the broad white community sentiment. For example, in 1943 the
Mayor of Baltimore spoke publicly in support of whites seeking to keep Blacks out of
their neighborhood, even if that entailed the use of criminal means to accomplish
that purpose. See id. at 74.
2" As Stephen Carter suggests, African-Americans "know, in the way that they
know their own names, that the criminal justice system is not the same for them as it
is for others." Stephen L. Carter, When Victims Happen to be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420, 441
(1988). The very limited punishment imposed in the few cases where there were ar-
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One exception is a report (not discussed by Meyer) on arrests,
prosecutions, and disposition of the cases involving whites who
resisted mightily the entry of a small number of Black families
into Chicago's Trumbull Park Homes public housing develop-
ment in the mid-1950s. 275 The violent resistance lasted two years
initially, and it ebbed and flowed for a decade. So, the dura-
tion, intensity, number, and severity of the crimes make "crime
276wave" an apt term.
The attacks began in the summer of 1953 with almost fifty
white teenagers throwing rocks, bricks, and other objects at the
home of the Howards, the first Black family to enter the devel-
opment.277 The destruction forced the family to replace their
living room window with plywood. The resisters also used aerial
"bombs," which propelled a series of charges and exploded with
a bright flash and deafening thunder. On the worst nights,
perpetrators detonated a hundred of these devices. The har-
assment continued day and night.
The resistance was so great that twelve hundred police offi-
cers accompanied the several Black families that moved into the
development a few months later.2 7  The police presence kept
the initial resistance from escalating beyond the anti-integration
crowd throwing a barrage of sticks and stones as the convoy en-
tered.279
As more Black families moved in, community residents con-
tinued the resistance, including detonating explosives every half
hour to remind Blacks of the dangers of continuing to live
rests, prosecutions, and conviction suggests a devaluing of Blacks' personhood, prop-
erty, privacy, and security.
271 See COMM'N ON HuMAN RELATIONS, CITY OF CHICAGO, THE TRUMBULL PARK HOMEs
DISTURBANCES: A CHRONOLOGICAL REPORT, AUGUST 4, 1953 TOJUNE 30, 1955 (1955).
276 Historian Arnold Hirsch refers to whites' response as a northern version of
"massive resistance," invoking a term that has been used to characterize the response
of many southern school districts to the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board
of Education in the same period. See Arnold Hirsch, Massive Resistance in the Urban
North: Trumbull Park, Chicago, 1953-1966,J. AM. HIST. 522 (1995).
277 At the time, CHA was attempting to keep the development all-white, but the
Howard family slipped through because Betty Howard was very fair skinned and the
manager of the development did not realize in accepting her application that she was
Black. Later, CHA implemented its non-discrimination policy by intentionally admit-
ting a few Black families to the development. Id. at 522.
278 See id. at 529.
279 Id.
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there. Frequently, whites attacked Black residents as they
walked the streets in the area, even threatening them with
lynching if they took certain routes. Meanwhile, the "bomb-
ings" continued on a regular basis, coming ever closer to the
homes of Black residents.8 °
Among the periodic escalations of violence was an eruption
in 1957 that resulted in the beating of one African-American on
the street and an attack by nearly one hundred whites on a
Black resident's apartment-ransacking the home, breaking
furniture, throwing a television and radio into the street, and
setting fire to the curtains. 1
In this years-long ordeal, the police were active in protect-
ing and escorting Black families in their normal daily activities
such as shopping and traveling to work and arresting some of
the perpetrators of crimes against them (while, once again,
many crimes went unreported) .282 In the first two years, there
were over 150 arrests, mostly on local charges of disorderly con-
duct and state charges under "riot" and "unlawful assembly"
statutes.2 3
Prosecutions resulted as well.28 4 Appendices C and D chart
the charges and dispositions. While the violence was intense
and prolonged, the charges were relatively minor and the sanc-
tions the court imposed, if any, were almost always small fines.
The majority of the three hundred charges filed were local dis-
orderly conduct charges. Another quarter of the charges was
for state offenses of "riot" and unlawful assembly. Many of these
cases were discharged, while most of the rest of the offenders
were ordered to pay small fines. Only one offender received a
jail term-ten days in the house of corrections.
20 As Blacks tried to enter into community life, they exposed themselves to addi-
tional dangers. Three women who attended a local church encountered a crowd of
thirty awaiting them as they left the church. One white woman attacked the Blacks
with her umbrella. Id. at 538.
28' Id. at 548.
2 8 Id. at 527-29, 533-38, 46.
28' See Appendix C.
2' See COMM'N ON HuMAN RELATIONS, supra note 275, at 62-63.
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VII. BEYOND THE 1960s
Meyer's account ends in 1968, with the passage of the fed-
eral Fair Housing Act, which he deems a watershed event. The
extent to which there has been continuity and change in the
crimes of resistance to Black entry since that time, and why,
remain to be examined. There are reasons to hypothesize that
housing-related crimes have declined in number and severity
over the last several decades. At the same time, there are also
good reasons to suspect that these crimes are still very much
with us and may have even increased at some points and in
some places. The enactment of the Fair Housing Act illustrates
this duality of expectations.
A. FACTORS POTENTIALLY AFFECTING HOUSING-RELATED CRIME
1. The Fair Housing Act
The Federal Fair Housing Act, enacted as Title VIII of the
1968 Civil Rights Act, prohibits discrimination based on race
and other prohibited categories in most public and private
housing.285 While the Fair Housing Act emphasized protecting
home seekers against discrimination in gaining access to hous-
ing, it also prohibited discrimination against people once they
occupied their housing. Meyer seems optimistic about its ability
to reduce criminal resistance to Black families who have moved
into predominantly white areas. He views the statute as reduc-
ing violence by shifting most of the action from the streets to
the courts.286
There could be several reasons for such expectations, be-
yond a general belief in the efficacy of law. The statute legiti-
mated the idea of residential racial integration as an American
value, thus condemning opposition to it. While the term "inte-
gration" does not appear in its text, the most quoted statement
from its legislative history is sponsor Senator Walter Mondale's
28 See 42 U.S.C. § 3601-3619, 3631 (1994).
Also in 1968, the Supreme Court, in Jones v. Mayer, decided that the 1866 Civil
Rights Act prohibits racial discrimination in housing by private parties. Jones v. Al-
fred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
2186 MEYER, supra note 2, at 10.
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hope that "[t] he rapid, block by block expansion of the ghetto
will be slowed and replaced by truly integrated and balanced liv-
,,287
ing patterns. In defining a "right" of people of color to live
where they wished, Congress also defined resistance to Blacks'
entry as a denial of residents' legal rights.
Moreover, the statute put the weight of the federal govern-
ment behind the ideal of open communities. It was the first of
the 1960s' civil rights statutes to address directly the deeply em-
bedded practices of housing discrimination.288  In addition to
defining substantive prohibitions, Congress delegated enforce-
ment of the statute to HUD and the Justice Department, speci-
fied procedures, remedies, and sanctions, and provided
resources to enforce the new regime. The particulars were sub-
ject to criticism from civil rights advocates at the time, and in-
creasing criticism over time; but the establishment of a legal
framework that institutionalized the norm of non-
discrimination could have in itself reduced white resistance to
African-American households making integrationist moves.2 89
At the same time, there was serious doubt about whether
the Fair Housing Act would substantially change the earlier pat-
tern of criminal resistance to Black entry. That would have in-
volved reversing "centuries of cultural practice, to change their
[white neighbors' and others'] attitudes about race, and to ac-
cept integration in their neighborhood." °
Moreover, most of the resistance recounted here had in-
volved violations of local, state, or federal criminal laws. Poten-
tial criminal liability, with the accompanying sanctions and
punishment, would seem to hold greater prospects for deter-
rence than the civil proscriptions of the Fair Housing Act. On
the other hand, Meyer shows the limited enforcement of those
267 114 CONG. REc. 3422 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Mondale).
2m Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibited racial discrimination in pro-
grams receiving federal assistance, such as the public housing program; but it did not
reach the vast bulk of the country's housing. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
26. Congress amended Title VIII in 1988, broadening its scope and strengthening
its enforcement mechanisms. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3620 (1994).
290 MEYER, supra note 2, at 211. Fear of white neighbors' hostility-manifested by
criminal behavior or otherwise-helps to explain the fact that many middle-class
Blacks consciously choose to live in Black neighborhoods rather than predominantly
white ones.
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criminal statutes against housing-related perpetrators. Thus,
federal regulation could have made a difference, as it had in
other civil rights areas where the federal government had
stepped in to fill the void in state legislation or enforcement.2
1
2. Other Factors
Other forces at work since the 1960s could also have af-
fected whites' attitudes and actions toward African-American
neighbors-including the frequency and severity of housing-
related racial crimes. There may have been forces operating to
reduce, to maintain, or to increase this kind of criminal activity.
The urban rebellions of the late 1960s may have fueled whites'
fears of Blacks. Many whites continued to fear racial "invasion"
because of increased association in many people's minds of
Blacks with gangs and crime, especially drug-related offenses
and accompanying violence. Racial profiling became a newly
labeled phenomenon as a result.
2
A number of factors suggest the possibility of a reduction in
these crimes in more recent times, including the effects of the
Civil Rights movement, the enactment and enforcement of hate
crimes legislation, changing attitudes reflecting increased racial
tolerance among whites, increased ability of whites to move to
the suburbs, the growth of the Black middle class, an increase in
the number of racially integrated neighborhoods, and the prac-
tical consequences of resistance on communities' reputations.
Hate crimes legislation gives greater visibility to the problem
of race-based crimes, while enhancing the punishment for
them. These laws also send a message to the police, the prose-
cutors, and the courts that these offenses are to be taken seri-
2' See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOw HOPE: CAN COURTS BRINGABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? 94-100 (1991).
22 Backlash against the Civil Rights movement and affirmative action may also play
a role. Moreover, even with all of the changes in women's role in the labor market,
cultural norms continued to give women primary responsibility for protecting their
children from external threats and bad influences. The "Million Mom March" re-
flected this continuing reality, with its emphasis on the well-being of the children.
The question for future research is the extent to which that suggests continuity with
the white women who earlier resisted Blacks moving into their neighborhoods in or-
der to protect their children.
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ously and pursued actively. The result may be a measure of de-
terrence of housing-related crimes.
Moreover, surveys suggest that whites' attitudes have
changed in the direction of greater racial tolerance since the
1960s. 3 Increased tolerance could lead to decreased resistance
to residential integration. That period includes the Vietnam
War, and racial progress has often accompanied foreign crises.2
4
In addition, the last third of the twentieth century witnessed
a continuing rapid growth of the suburbs in many metropolitan
areas. Whites who objected to the presence of Blacks in their
city neighborhoods had the option to "exit," which decreased
their incentive to resist ("flight" rather than "fight").2 5 Moreo-
ver, as predominantly white communities developed farther and
farther from the inner city, the "threat" posed by Black entry
diminished. A generation earlier, Blacks moving into a city
neighborhood signaled to whites that many more Blacks would
follow unless they resisted mightily. Racial turnover was less
likely as a small number of Blacks ventured out to the newly de-
veloping outer-ring suburbs.296  Moreover, the Blacks who
moved into these relatively affluent communities were usually
part of the expanding Black middle class of professionals, busi-
ness people, and academics whose lifestyles fit in with the local
community's culture. 97 While common traits and interests did
not necessarily protect Black entrants in earlier times, changes
in white attitudes might have ,been reflected most in their re-
sponse to newcomers of similar or higher status.
The last part of the century also saw an increase in the
number of neighborhoods that remained racially integrated
2" See HOwARD SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICA: TRENDS AND
INTERPRETATIONS (1997).
m See PHILIP A. KLINKER & ROGERS M. SMITH, THE UNSTEADY MARCH: THE RISE AND
DECLINE OF RACIAL EQUALIY IN AMERICA (1999) (arguing that America's history re-
flects an ebb and flow of progress and retrenchment in civil rights, with progress oc-
curring only under particular and unusual conditions).
2 See ALBERT HIRSCHMAN, ExIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970) (explaining why peo-
ple leave or stay in declining institutions, and the possibilities for repairing such insti-
tutions).
vA Gautreaux families encountered relatively few physical threats or violence in
their moves, from 1976 to the late 1990s. RUBINOWITZ ETAL., supra note 13, at 94-99.
"7 INGRID GOULD ELLEN, SHARING AMERICA'S NEIGHBORHOODS: THE PROSPECTS FOR
STABLE RACIAL INTEGRATION 76-77 (2000).
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over time.2' s This stability may have reflected a reduction in the
level of racial resistance and attendant criminal activity.'
Pragmatic, market-oriented considerations may also have af-
fected whites' responses to Black entry. Concerns about the ef-
fect of violence on the neighborhood's or community's
reputation and local property values could lead to reduced vio-
lence and threats. Potential perpetrators could conclude that
criminal activities aimed at expulsion would be counter-
productive in terms of the goals of protecting and enhancing
their community.
B. RESEARCH NEEDED
While these factors push in both directions, systematic re-
search is needed to determine the nature and extent of hous-
ing-related crimes in the last third of the twentieth century and
the early twenty-first century. The goal would be to approach
the ideal research methods and results discussed earlier. 300 Re-
search should uncover and examine accounts and other data
from across the country. This kind of coverage would try to
provide a comprehensive and exhaustive national picture and
facilitate comparisons over time. Local in-depth case studies
would complement the broad national picture. Just as histori-
ans and sociologists have turned their attention to studies of lo-
cal civil rights movements, local accounts of housing-based
racial resistance would provide a richness and depth of analysis
301that is not possible in a national survey.
29 See id. at 12-34.
299 At the same time, these demographic patterns created more opportunities for
residential contact between people of different races and therefore more chances for
this kind of white-on-Black crime. Still, even if whites initially resisted Black pioneers,
crimes against newcomers may have declined over time, thus contributing to the con-
tinuing Black presence.
goo See supra pp. 340-41.
'0. See generally CHARLES PAYNE, I'VE GOT THE LIGHT OF FREEDOM: THE ORGANIZING
TRADITION AND THE MIssissiPpi FREEDOM STRUGGLE (1995) (chronicling in great depth
the grass roots civil rights movement in Mississippi). Local housing studies could in-
clude smaller cities such as follow-up research on Dubuque, Iowa, Valparaiso, Indi-
ana, and Yonkers, New York, as well as large cities and suburbs-especially the
predominantly white suburbs developed in the postwar period. See discussion infra
pp. 409-11. Other localities worthy of study include those where racial or economic
interrogation programs have been carried out through litigation or under programs
such as HUD's Moving to Opportunity. See generally LEONARD S. RUBINOWITZ ET AL.,
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C. HYPOTHESES AND PRELIMINARY DATA
While the balance of forces points towards a possible de-
cline in housing-related crimes since the 1960s, it is clear that
efforts at expulsion did not cease with the passage of the Fair
Housing Act or because of the other factors discussed above.
Several large studies since the 1960s have found that discrimina-
tion against Black home-seekers in predominantly white areas
continued substantially unabated.0 2 With so much discrimina-
tion in the housing market, it was not likely that housing-related
crimes would disappear. In fact, anecdotal data suggest that
these crimes persisted through the remainder of the twentieth
century and into the twenty-first century. While the frequency
and severity of such attacks is uncertain, this sad saga remains
part of a more than a century-long pattern of race-based hous-
ing-related criminal activity.
The following discussion of housing-related crimes since the
1960s is designed simply to scratch the surface of the data
needed to develop a comprehensive picture. It also tries to
point toward sources that would need to be tapped for that
purpose. The Section provides a glimpse of the crimes and the
kinds of data that would fill out the more recent story.
While the housing-related crime patterns for recent decades
remain to be determined, even partial, readily available data
suggests that many of the recurring themes from the earlier pe-
riod continued-persistence of these crimes over time with an
ebb and flow of periods of turbulence and relative calm, geo-
graphical spreading of the offenses, a variety of perpetrators
and victims, severe tangible and intangible injuries, and a lim-
ited response by the police and the criminal justice system. So-
cietal changes suggest that there may have been progress; but if
so, it does not seem to have been linear. There is substantial
evidence indicating that racist attitudes, assumptions, and ac-
CROSSING THE CLASS AND COLOR LINES: FROM PUBLIC HOUSING TO WHITE SUBURBIA
(2000).
... See generally DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993) (examining the causes and
consequences of residential racial discrimination); JOHN YINGER, CLOSED DOORS,
OPPORTUNITIES LOST: THE CONTINUING COST OF HOUSING DISCRIMINATION (1995) (dis-
cussing the extent and costs of continuing housing discrimination based on race).
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tions continued to produce crimes of resistance when Blacks
moved into predominantly white neighborhoods."'
The Southern Poverty Law Center's 1987 report "'Move-In'
Violence: White Resistance To Neighborhood Integration in the
1980s," documents extensive housing-related violence in the
mid-1980s.50° The report examines various aspects of these
crimes-their location, timing, and the offenses themselves. It
also identifies the perpetrators, the victims, and the impact of
the crimes, and provides glimpses into the law enforcement part
of the story.
The report emphasizes the national scope of the problem.
In what it refers to as a "sample" of serious move-in incidents in
just the years 1985 and 1986, the report identifies incidents
from virtually every region of the country-the South (Marietta,
Georgia; Nashville, Tennessee; Louisville, Kentucky; Amory,
Mississippi; DeKalb County, Georgia); the East (Elizabeth, New
Jersey; Baltimore, Maryland; Forest Hills, Pennsylvania; Phila-
delphia, Pennsylvania; Tilghman Island, Maryland; Fairless
Hills, Pennsylvania; Newburg, Maryland; Harrisburg, Pennsylva-
nia; Rolla, Maryland; Hamilton Township, New Jersey); New
England (Boston, Massachusetts; Sharon, Massachusetts); the
Midwest (Toledo, Ohio; Cleveland, Ohio; Sandusky, Ohio; Chi-
cago, Illinois; Indianapolis, Indiana); the West Coast (San Di-
ego, California); and the Pacific Northwest (Seattle,
Washington) In fact, a majority of the forty-five known arson
and cross burning attempts in that brief period took place in
metropolitan areas of the North and Midwest. 0 6  The one
known death connected to housing-related crimes in that pe-
... The possible increase involves central cities as well as suburbs. The Cleveland
Human Relations Commission reported an increase in incidents from 50 to 77 be-
tween 1985 and 1986. See THE SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, SPECIAL REPORT:
"MoVE-IN" VIOLENCE: WHITE RESISTANCE TO NEIGHBORHOOD INTEGRATION IN THE 1980s
11 (1987). Under-reporting continued to be a problem, as a result of victims' fears,
denial, or lack of faith in law enforcement. Id. at 2, 15.
... The study was based on newspaper accounts, government reports, and inter-
views with human relations specialists and police officials. The report used the term
"move-in violence" because law enforcement officials and social workers had named
it. See id. at 2, 1.
305 The listing includes multiple incidents in a number of these communities. Id.
at Appendix.
30. See id. at 3.
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riod took place in Cleveland, where a Black woman died in an
arson fire of her home.0 7
The report also noted the frequency of incidents taking
place in the suburbs, as Blacks increasingly joined in the subur-
banization process that previously had been largely a white exo-
dus from the cities. That is a change from the earlier period
when Black people were excluded from the suburbs so effec-
tively that there were relatively few instances of suburban crimes
of resistance.08 The change in mobility patterns led the report's
authors to speculate that housing-related crimes might actually
increase as more Blacks move into previously all-white areas.309
With respect to the timing of incidents, the earlier unpre-
dictability seems to have persisted. Some families were victim-
ized as soon as they moved in. In other cases, fire bombings
and arson were last resorts in an escalating process to expel un-
wanted neighbors.1 0
Like Meyer, the Southern Poverty Law Center found that
white supremacists were only a part of the problem.' In many
places where attacks took place, the KKK and similar organiza-
tions were not active. Moreover, in the few instances where ar-
rests were made, the suspects did not seem to be members of
racist organizations. More often, individuals and groups from
within the community objected so strongly to having Blacks
among them that they resorted to violence to exclude them.1 2
This suggests that even in the latter parts of the twentieth cen-
tury, there remained a broad base of opposition to Black entry
in many places. Young people played an important role in ex-
pressing that opposition. In a number of instances, young peo-
ple instigated or played a significant role in the criminal
activity.
313
307 See id. at 3, 10-11.
'0' The report cites the head of the Justice Department's Community Relations
Service as suggesting that the apparent increase in the number of attacks suggests
that the process of neighborhood integration is proceeding, albeit with difficulty. See
id. at 14.
... See id. at 1.
310 See id. at 5.
.. See id. at 2-3, 6-7, 12-13.
See id. at 3.
"' See id. at 6, 8, 10, 15.
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In addition to the hundreds of incidents annually of graffiti
and minor vandalism (which could, nevertheless, have severe
impacts on their victims), the report identifies a variety of more
serious offenses, including burning crosses, vandalizing prop-
erty (including painting racial slurs and swastikas on the prop-
erty), making threatening phone calls, setting fire to the
family's vehicle, firing shots into the home, firebombing of the
home, and setting fire to the home."4 Many of these offenses
occurred in a number of places, especially cross burnings and
fire bombings. Some homes were targeted more than once, es-
pecially if the first effort to burn it down did not succeed."5
As in the earlier period, victims included middle-class up-
wardly mobile African-American families. In an episode that is
reminiscent of the Wade family's experience in suburban Louis-
ville four decades earlier, the Marshall family was greeted with
immediate hostility when they moved into the mostly white Lou-
isville suburb of Sylvania in 1985.16 However, in this instance,
the racial slurs escalated into a fire bombing that damaged the
home the first night that the family was there. A second arson
fire destroyed the home two months later.
17
Once again, Chicago accounts reinforce the evidence of
continuing criminal activity. In 1984, an African-American fam-
ily rented an apartment in a predominantly white outlying Chi-
cago neighborhood. "8 They were victims of multiple criminal
"' The Southern Poverty Law Center collected additional instances of housing-
related violence in SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, TERROR IN OUR NEIGHBORHOODS:
A KLANWATcH REPORT ON HOUSING VIOLENCE IN AMERIcA (1990) [hereinafter TERROR
IN OUR NEIGHBORHOODS] and SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, HATE VIOLENCE AND
WHITE SUPREMACY: A DECADE REVIEW 1980-1990 (1989).
"' A number of crimes were inchoate ones, such as attempts to firebomb a home
that failed. See id. at Appendix.
"' See TERROR IN OUR NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 314, at 5. For a discussion of
the Wades' experience, see supra text accompanying notes 76, 235.
117 In another episode reminiscent of an earlier era, open housing demonstrators
marching into Chicago's predominantly white southwest side in 1986 encountered
whites throwing rocks and bottles at them, as had occurred in the summer of 1966.
See SOUTHERN POvERTY LAW CENTER, supra note 303, at 7.
318 The neighborhood is called the Island, which is located on Chicago's border
with Cicero, a notoriously racist community historically. See the discussion of the
1951 incident in Cicero, infra. See MEYER, supra note 2, at 118-19. This account is
based largely on the deposition of Spencer Goffer, one of the victims of the attack.
DEPOSITION OF SPENCER GOFFER, GOFFER V. CICERO No. 84 C 10024 (N.D.III. 1985); see
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offenses by a group of perpetrators in a very short span of time.
Shortly after they moved into the apartment, someone threw a
tire iron through their living room window. The next night,
people threw beer bottles, bricks, and other objects through
their windows for hours, while shouting racial slurs. The phone
had not been installed, so they were unable to call the police.
However, a police car from the neighboring community of
Cicero stopped at the scene during the attack. When the family
saw the police car, they thought that help had arrived and the
attack would stop. Instead, the police officer simply spoke to
the perpetrators, watched the process for a short time, and
drove away. The police took no steps to stop the attack or arrest
the perpetrators.
The family escaped through a back alley in the middle of
the night, and never returned. They eventually sued the city of
Cicero and secured a modest settlement, but there were no
criminal prosecutions of the perpetrators or the police growing
out of these attacks. 19
In the Atlanta area, Blacks moving into some predominantly
white areas continued to encounter racial attacks at least
through the 1980s. In a seven-month span of 1989, there were
six publicly reported incidents of racial vandalism in Clayton
County: "'KKK' was written on some homes, a cross was burned,
and others had sayings including 'Nigger Get' and 'Die Tomor-





As in the earlier period, late century victims ranged across
the income and social class spectrum. Whites' violent reactions
to public housing integration efforts in the 1990s harkened
back to the Chicago and Detroit experiences of the 1940s and
1950s, and the Boston experience of the 1960s and 1970s. Sev-
eral episodes suggest a degree of continuity of previous
themes-the cross-regional locations of the crimes and the vic-
also GREGORY D. SQUIRES ET AL., CHICAGO: RACE, CLASS, AND THE RESPONSE TO URBAN
DECLINE 102 (1987).
"' This account is also based on conversations with Patricia Franklin, the woman in
the family. She was the secretary of the first author at Northwestern Law School for a
number of years.
'20 GARY ORFIELD & CAROLE ASHKINAZE, THE CLOSING DOOR: CONSERVATIVE POLICY
AND BLACK OPPORTUNITY 77 (1991) (citing the Atlanta Constitution, October 18,
1989).
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timization extending to low-income families. In Boston and in
the east Texas town of Vidor, opponents engaged in criminal
acts to expel Black families from white-occupied developments
in white areas. In Yonkers, a suburb of New York City, criminals
struck before construction was even complete on public hous-
ing to be occupied by African-American families in a white
neighborhood.
Chicago's landmark Gautreaux public housing desegrega-
tion case spawned many progeny around the country.32' For ex-
ample, in the late 1980s, as a result of an NAACP lawsuit, the
Boston Housing Authority attempted to integrate its housing by
assigning some Black families to white-occupied developments
in predominantly white, working-class south Boston.3 2  Resi-
dents of "Southie" reacted quickly and angrily to the plan for
what they called "forced housing." 2  One community leader
announced on television news that "there's gonna be a blood-
bath. 32 4 The families moved in late at night, surrounded by po-
lice escorts in the event of trouble. And the first Black families
had around-the-clock police protection.
While the 1990s' resistance did not seem to be as wide-
spread as the sustained harassment and violence of the 1960s
and 1970s, these accounts indicate that many white residents re-
sisted integration. In 1992, two-thirds of south Boston's sixty-six
reported racial crimes occurred in the public housing develop-
ments there.3 25 Black and Latino families that moved into public
housing in white neighborhoods faced such serious and con-
tinuing racist encounters that thirteen families filed suit on be-
half of a class of similarly situated public housing residents.
They sued the Boston Housing Authority and the City of Boston
for failure to protect them from racially motivated violence,
harassment, and intimidation.326 The thirteen named plaintiffs
12 Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
The initial remedial order is at Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 304 F. Supp.
736 (N.D. I11. 1969). RUBINOITZETAL., supra note 13, at 174-87.
322 McDONALD, supra note 147, at 214-16.
321 See id. at 214.
324 Id.
325 See VALE, SALVAGING PUBLIC HOUSING, supra note 69, ch. 2.
326 See Jane Doe v. Boston Housing Authority, Civil Action 96-12540, Amended
Class Action Complaint (filed June 14, 1998).
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alleged various forms of harassment, threats, and attacks. They
described threats and assaults directed at them and their chil-
dren (including rocks thrown at them, gunshots fired at them,
and an attempted stabbing), vandalism and attacks on their
apartments (including bricks and urine thrown and gunshots
fired through their windows and a threat to blow up the home),
and damage to their cars (including broken windshields and
windows, tires slashed, a car set on fire, and another car stolen
and crashed). 327 One woman who was nine months pregnant
claimed that teenagers trapped her inside her apartment by ty-
ing the door shut.
18
Several plaintiffs alleged that the police were unresponsive
or inept in dealing with these crimes. 2' Complaints to the po-
lice went ignored in some cases. In others, police efforts were
ineffective in preventing attacks or arresting suspects.
These crimes caused extensive property damage, as sug-
gested above. In some cases, that also meant out-of-pocket ex-
penses for things like repairing vandalized cars. The crimes also
produced serious emotional trauma, as exemplified by the reac-
tion of one African-American resident: "When I moved to South
Boston, I didn't know this was going on right here in America. I
was so sad. I was so afraid. I hope I never have to live this
again.
Meanwhile, a federal judge ordered the desegregation of
public housing developments in thirty-six counties across east
Texas.33' As the first four Black families moved into a previously
all white complex in Vidor, they were greeted by threats of vio-
lence, some from teenagers wearing sheets.33 All of those fami-
11 For further discussion of these claims, see Janet Moore, Racial Discrimination in




.. Andrea Estes, Families: Years in Housing Were Terrifying Nightmare, THE BOSTON
HERALD,July 27, 1999, at 19.
"' Young v. Pierce, 628 F. Supp. 1037 (E.D. Tex. 1985).
112 Mr. Cisneros Marches on Vidor, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 16, 1993, at A14.
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lies moved out of Vidor Village quickly after they suffered "un-
remitting hostility" from some whites.
Federal marshals and local police accompanied the next
group of Blacks, who moved into the development under cover
of darkness with a HUD escort as well.334 Initially, the complex
remained under twenty-four hour police guard to protect the
new residents from threats or violence.
A civil suit filed in 1994 alleged that two KKK chapters in
the area had used a threat to blow up the development as a
means of intimidation to prevent its integration.33' The suit also
alleged that a Klan member had offered white children in the
development fifty dollars if they would beat up Black children
living there.
At the same time, a HUD administrative law judge (ALJ)
found, in response to an administrative complaint, that a white
woman who resided in Vidor Village had threatened a Black
resident with a baseball bat, had spread the word that the KKK
intended to burn down the complex and shoot anyone who
tried to escape, and had made death threats and other physical
threats against Black residents.3 ' Based on these findings, the
ALJ awarded substantial damages and imposed a civil penalty.
Yonkers, a suburb of New York City, attracted national at-
tention in the 1980s and 1990s as the site of a bitter and pro-
longed legal, political, and social struggle over desegregation of
the city's public housing program.37 After years of court battles
over building public housing in white neighborhoods, construc-
tion of some townhouses began. A bomb damaged one of the
first townhouses under construction .
Black families that moved in feared additional violence be-
cause of whites' angry opposition to the judge's orders requir-
ing public housing construction in white neighborhoods. The
... Sam Howe Verhovek, Under Armed Escort, Blacks Move into White Texas Housing
Project, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 14, 1994, § 1, at 1.
3"4 Id.
335 Id.
... 1994 WL 391135 (H.U.D.A.L.J.) (July 26, 1994).
"3 See LISA BELKIN, SHOW ME A HERO (1999) (an in-depth account of the Yonkers
experience).
.. Id. at 3-4, 193-95. Local officials made no arrests.
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fear increased as a result of the initial reaction to their arrival-
apparent surveillance and stares by whites.339
Housing-related racial crimes in the 1990s were not limited
to the public housing setting. Dubuque, Iowa, a Mississippi
River city of about 58,000 with a Black population of only a few
hundred, provided a dramatic example of the broader problem.
In 1991, the city council adopted a plan designed to attract
about twenty Black families annually for a total of about one
hundred families by the mid-1990s 4 ° Part of the impetus for
the plan was a desire to make a public statement that Blacks
were welcome in the community, in spite of a 1989 incident in
which racists burned a Black family's garage, burned a cross
there, and painted graffiti that said "KKK lives."
3 4
1
Shortly after the city council adopted the plan, there were a
dozen cross burnings and bricks thrown through the windows of
Black homes."' Blacks were also the targets of hate messages
and other verbal and physical harassment. Moreover, cross
burnings spread to other Iowa cities, such as Des Moines, Water-
loo, Jefferson, and Iowa City.
343
As in earlier times, these attacks had powerful psychological
impacts. One Black spoke of the cross-burnings as bringing
frightening reverberations of his father's time, which caused
him to feel "personally violated."344 For Blacks, cross-burnings
continued to symbolize exclusion and even death. "'
While law enforcement officials apprehended some perpe-
trators, prosecutors and judges continued to treat the offenses
as minor ones. At the state level, judges gave relatively lenient
sentences to several cross burners. A year later, the U.S. Justice
. Id. at 216-19.
" JOE R. FEAGIN, HERNAN VERA, WHITE RACISM 37 (2d ed. 2001).
341 See id. at 37.
342 id,
44 I& at 37-38.
'4 While the perpetrators were few in number, other whites seemed to support
their acts. Fellow workers reportedly congratulated and applauded cross burners
when they returned from short prison sentences. Id. at 44. The Dubuque confronta-
tion also attracted white supremacists from other parts of the country, who came to
the city to stir up still greater resistance by describing their opposition as a war against
Black encroachment on the "white way of life." Id. at 39.
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Department began to secure indictments for violations of fed-
eral civil rights laws, leading finally to the conviction of six1 • 346
whites for cross burnings.
D. RESEARCH FEASIBILITY
Useful data on the recent past and the current and future
situation would include systematic statistics of the kind de-
scribed earlier, as well as in-depth accounts of local situations
and specific instances of egregious housing-related crimes. 7
While some of this data is currently available, major efforts are
necessary to gain a greater understanding of the extent to which
these kinds of crimes still need to be addressed.
In some ways, it would be easier to do follow-up research
than it was for Meyer to do his original work. 8 As a result of
the public attention given to "hate crimes" in recent decades,
there is more extensive data available than previously. The
mainstream media-especially newspapers-have devoted more
attention to these accounts than in the past.34 9 Also, law en-
546 See id. at 44.
... For such in-depth local case studies in earlier periods, see generally SUGRUE, su-
pra note 37; KRUSE, supra note 34. While the experiences in one locality cannot be
generalized across the country, local case studies can provide rich description and
analysis of the processes in a specific place. They are an invaluable complement to
analyses that are broader based geographically.
Local case studies might also focus on housing-related crimes with victims from
other racial, ethnic and religious groups, such as Latinos, Arab-Americans, and Mus-
lims-especially in the aftermath of September 11th. See, e.g., Mary Leonard, Fighting
Terror Domestic Impact/Civil Rights; Arab-Americans Feel Sting of Profiling Mich. Community
Protests Bias and Even Hate Crimes, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 19, 2001, at A20 (discuss-
ing anti-Arab-American sentiment and actions in the Detroit suburb of Dearborn,
which has a substantial Arab-American population).
Such studies could also consider perpetrators other than whites, including Latinos
and other groups resisting entrants of those from different racial, ethnic, or religious
backgrounds. See, e.g., Ron Russell and Victor Meija, City of Fear; Amid a Wave of Hate
Crimes Committed by Latinos-including Murder-Blacks are Fleeing the Tiny Community of
Hawaiian Gardens, NEwTIMmEs L.A., Feb. 12, 1998.
... There is extensive and quite systematic empirical research on racial discrimina-
tion in the housing search in the post-Fair Housing Act era, but there is no compara-
ble research on whites' post-move reactions to Blacks moving into predominantly
white neighborhoods and communities.
'" In the past, the Black press covered these incidents far more extensively than
white newspapers, which often downplayed racial violence. SUGRUE, supra note 37, at
234-35. Black newspapers constitute an invaluable source for further research on the
earlier periods as well as more recent times. Moreover, research on many newspapers
can be done on-line, thus making a more comprehensive national media search more
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forcement agencies at the federal, state, and local level have be-
gun to collect data on hate crimes, some of which may be bro-
ken down so that housing-related crimes can be examined.50
In 1991, Congress enacted legislation designed to compile
national hate crime statistics, an effort designed to reveal the
dimensions of the problem over time.351  Collecting this data
could assist in developing policies and programmatic initiatives
to address the causes and reduce the occurrence of hate crimes.
However, a decade later, critics of this voluntary reporting
system said that the national effort to document hate crimes was
"in shambles"-plagued by a variety of problems, including the
failure of local and state officials to pass along accurate data to
the FBI if they submitted any reports at all.352 The controversial
nature of these crimes, the lack of training of law enforcement
officials in reporting hate crimes, the fear of negative publicity
damaging a community's reputation, the coding of the offenses
based on the underlying charge, and the tendency to dismiss
many incidents as "childish pranks" all contributed to the un-
der-reporting.353  In light of these factors and the general dis-
trust of the police by minority group members, victims are often
reluctant to report these crimes to the police.
As a result of the confluence of these problems, the pub-
lished figures vastly understate the prevalence of hate crimes.
Moreover, the lack of credible statistics makes it impossible to
determine whether these crimes--generally, or housing-related
feasible than in the past. At the same time, many newspapers are not on-line, includ-
ing Black newspapers that might pay particular attention to such incidents, and
highly labor-intensive old-fashioned searches would still be necessary in many cases.
See David Garrow, Hopelessly Hollow History: Revisionist Devaluing of Brown v. Board of
Education, 80 VA. L. REV. 151 (1994) (discussing the difficulty and the importance of
doing detailed research in local newspapers).
"o Crime victimization surveys could be useful here. The Bureau ofJustice does an
annual survey designed to overcome some of the underreporting problem by survey-
ing a large sample of respondents. The victimization survey strategy could be used to
sample Blacks and others likely to experience hate crimes to provide baseline data
that does not currently exist.
"' Hate Crime Statistics Act, Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (1990).
112 See Southern Poverty Law Center, Discounting Hate, 104 INTELLIGENcE REPORT 6
(2001).
353 For example, in Port St. Lucie, Florida, a swastika and other graffiti scrawled on
the walls outside a Black woman's apartment went unreported. Id. at 12.
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crimes in particular-have gone up or down since the statute's
enactment.
35 4
Private non-profit civil rights organizations like the South-
ern Poverty Law Center and other watchdog and advocacy or-
ganizations are also developing information on racially-
motivated crime, some of which is housing-related.355
Finally, many African-Americans and other people of color
have written memoirs, especially in the last decade. These ac-
counts sometimes include experiences living in predominantly
white communities and therefore may serve as a source of in-
formation about whites' responses to the Black families' pres-
356ence.
However, it is probably still not possible to get anything
close to a complete picture of these kinds of crimes and their
prosecution. There is no comprehensive national database of
such crimes that are reported. Moreover, under-reporting con-
tinues to be likely, and there may be some over-reporting as
well.
57
E. IMPORTANCE OF ADDITIONAL RESEARCH
Just as Meyer has provided an important service in making
the individual and institutional racism in this area more visible,
research on the more recent period would serve a public educa-
tion function.158 Especially in an era when many deny the con-
tinued existence of racism as anything other than aberrational
... The authors of a Justice Department-funded report "Improving the Quality and
Accuracy of Bias Crime Statistics Nationally" recommended a variety of steps to im-
prove the system, including improving police-community relationships to encourage
victims to report, developing formal policies and procedures for reporting and ad-
dressing hate crimes, training local law enforcement officials, and improving the FBI
reporting process. Id. at 15.
115 MEYER, supra note 2, at 219.
... See, generally PATRIcIA RAYBON, MY FIRST WHITE FRIEND: CONFESSIONS ON RACE,
LOVE, AND FORGIVENESS (1996) (recounting personal interracial experiences).
... In light of the differences in the kinds and amounts of data available for differ-
ent time periods, it will be difficult to make precise comparisons over time. If there is
more extensive data available for the recent past, this may suggest that crime has in-
creased or it may simply be an artifact of better reporting.
... Note that Feagin, Vera, and Batur make that an explicit purpose in White Ra-
cism. See generally FEAGIN & SIRES, supra note 50.
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behavior by extremists, serious follow-up work can facilitate
greater awareness of this aspect of race relations.
That research could also provide the basis for developing
preventative and remedial strategies to address any problems
discovered. These could be community-based initiatives or gov-
ernmental actions-either legislative or enforcement initiatives
aimed at a more precisely defined target.
359
EPILOGUE: OF STIGMATIZING RHETORIC AND STARK REALITIES
Another way of making sense of these housing-related
crimes is to look at the flip side. What has happened when
whites have moved into predominantly Black neighborhoods?
Have Blacks reacted and resisted in the ways that whites have
done to Blacks when the tables were turned? While there does
not seem to be any study of these questions, there also does not
seem to be even anecdotal evidence of criminal behavior de-
signed to expel the new neighbors.'r ° This is in stark contrast
both to the experiences of many Blacks entering white areas
and to stereotypes about Black criminality.
Whites have moved into predominantly Black areas either
through publicly funded redevelopment programs or through
gentrification. There does not seem to be a record of criminal
activities by Blacks in response to white entry in either instance.
One observer has suggested that it would be "unimaginable"
that Blacks would bomb the home of a white family moving into
"their" neighborhood . 6
Redevelopment programs have had the law, the resources,
and the power of the federal and local governments behind
them.62 Whether projects involved massive clearance, as in the
1950s, or partial clearance of an area after that, Blacks were of-
ten displaced, redevelopment took place, and whites often
... See generally DAVID COLE, No EQUALJUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN
CRIMINALJuSTICE SYSTEM (1999); RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAw (1997);
Stephen Carter, When Victims Happen to be Black, 97 YALE LJ. 420 (1988).
30 Of course, there may have been some such incidents that the authors have not
discovered; but those would truly be "isolated incidents."
"' Thanks to Natasha Tarpley for this observation.
6 See generally MARTIN ANDERSON, THE FEDERAL BULLDOZER (1964) (arguing that
the costs of the federal urban renewal program far outweighed its benefits).
LEONARD S. RUBINOWITZ & IMANI PERRY [Vol. 92
moved into the newly redeveloped area. While Blacks often
protested against these programs, and sometimes sued in an ef-
fort to prevent their displacement, the record does not reveal
criminal activity perpetrated against white in-movers or their
property.36 3
Gentrification is even more closely analogous to the phe-
nomenon Meyer explores-especially in its early stages. 4 It has
often occurred in Black neighborhoods-especially ones
deemed to be attractively located. Often, gentrification has be-
gun with one or a few white families moving into an area. The
process reflects disparities in power and resources, with whites
having the ability to buy into an "upgrading" neighborhood and
change its racial composition. Even with the threat that whites'
appearance represents to the continued presence of Blacks,
there is apparently no record of Blacks resisting white entry by
crimes against their person or property. Again, Blacks have
used legal strategies including protests and litigation to resist
the gentrification process, but do not seem to have taken the
approach so often used against them when the positions have
been reversed.
In referring to Dr. King's vision for Blacks, Alice Walker
suggested what it did not involve:
He did not say that one day it will be us chasing prospective buyers out
of our prosperous well-kept neighborhoods, or in other ways exhibiting
our snobbery and ignorance as all other ethnic groups before us have
done; what he said was that we had a right to live anywhere in this coun-
try we chose .... .6'
... See Garrett v. Hamtramck, 394 F. Supp. 1151 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Green Street
Assoc. v. Daley, 373 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1967); DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND
AMERICAN LAW 436 (2000); JAMES KUSHNER, FAIR HOUSING: DISCRIMINATION IN REAL
ESTATE, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND REVITALIZATION §§ 3.08, 6.01, 6.04, 8.08, 8.13,
8.20, 8.21, 9.05, 9.10 (2d ed. 1995).
'6 See generally MICHAEL LANG, GENTRIFICATION AMID URBAN DECLINE: STRATEGIES
FOR AMERICA'S OLDER CITIES (1982) (examining benefits and costs of gentrification
and ways of minimizing the negative effects); JOHN LOGAN & HARVEY MOLOTOCH,
URBAN FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PLACE 115-16 (1987); REVITALIZING
URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS 31-32 (W. Dennis Keating et al. eds., 1996).
... See ALICE WALKER, Civil Rights Movement What Good Was It?, in IN SEARCH OF OUR
MOTHERS' GARDENS: WOMANIST PROSE 125 (1983).
414
2002] RACIAL CONFLICT IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS
As is clearly the case historically, and as remains the case, this is
not a right that all whites seem bound to respect.36
In the infamous Dred Scott v. Sandford decision, the Supreme Court said, in
describing the status of Blacks, "that they had no rights which the white man was
bound to respect .. " Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857).
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APPENDiXA
HOUSING-RELATED CRIMES COMMITTED BY WHITES AGAINST
BLACK ENTRANTS
Source: STEPHEN GRANT MEYER, AS LONG As THEY DON'T MOVE NEXT DOOR:
SEGREGATION AND RACIAL CONFLICT IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS
(Rowman & Littlefield, 2000)
c. 1910 BALTIMORE stoned, chased out of home 
3 67
1910 ST. Louis several incidents of violent resistance,
including smashing windows3"
1910-1911 KANSAS CITY 7 bombs"'
c. 1911 EAST HOLLYWOOD 12 residents burst into Blacks' home and
ordered them out
370
1913 BALTIMORE stoned, threatened, bombarded several
homess"
c. 1913 LOUISVILLE stoning house where Black rented rooms' '
1916 KANSAS CITY 1 bomb'
1917 DALLAS violent resistance to migration"74
DETROIT forty blacks forced out of rooming house 7
CHICAGO riot, 537 injured, 1000 homeless74
CHICAGO bomb blew away front of Blacks' house 
3"
1917-1921 CHICAGO 58 bombings, 2 deaths, several injuries'
1918 PHILADELPHIA mob, turns to riot, Blacks' homes ransacked " "
1920s MIAMI bombs 4
1921 BROOKLYN death threat mailcd to Black entrant'
1921 NEW YORK death threats in the nail '
1922 ATLANTA school arson and several house bombings
.4i See S'IEI'IIEN GRANT MEYER, As LONG As TiLY DON'T MoVE Nixr DOOR:
SEGREGATION AND RA(:IAL CONFLICT IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 17 (2000).
' See id. at 21.
See id. at. 20.
I7o /d.
.57 See id. at 19.
"" See id. at 23.
171 See id. at 20.
".See id. at 58.
.T75 See id. at 36.
7' See id. at. 35.
77 ,See id. at 35.
ST, See id. at 34.
"' See id. at 36.
"" See id. at 124.
" See id. at. 33.
"11 See id. at 33.
""' See id. at 100.
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1924 NEWYORK death and fire threats, KKK, windows
smashed8
1924 BROOKLYN death threat from group purporting to be Ku
Klux Klan
1925 DETROIT bricks thrown through windows, 1000-2000
person mobs, death threat, bomb threat,
smash windows, gunshots8
1925 DETROIT mob of 5,000 whites threatened to burn down
Black man's home 
87
whites hurled bricks through windows and
ripped tiles from roof "
1,000 whites threw pieces of coal at house,
threatened lynching9
1927 DETROIT arsonists set 
house on fire 9
1928 DETROIT vandalism, threats, gunshots""
1929 DETROIT bomb, 9 families left homeless 
'
bomb destroyed apartment house-'
3
1937 ATLANTA cross 
burning
threats, attempt to burn house3'
5
CHICAGO rock thrown through window-
1940 DALLAS threats of violence; attempt to burn down
vacant house owned by Blacks; house stoned;
breaking windows; house burned to the
ground; attempted bombing; garage bombed;
vacant house next to Black entrant's house
bombed; bombing threatened; gang of 500
threw rocks; smashing windows and damaging
furniture, dishes
1940s DETROIT scores of incidents, "from the use of warnings
and threats to the crimes of malicious
dcstriction of property and arson"; dumping
slag on cleared land, preventing constrlction
by Black family; hundreds of threatening
phone calls to realtor after selling to Black
"' See id. at 33.
' Id.
m' See id. at, 37-38.
M See id. at 37
I d.
" See id. at 37.
See id. at 45.
' See id. at 45.
'" Id.
See id. at 45.
See id. at 57.
Ie ld.
See id. at 56.
W7 See id. at 59.
" See id. at 91.
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1940-1941 DALLAS nearly 20 bombings in 15 months
1941 DALLAS explosion destroyed home, house bombed
three times over four months , apartments
wrecked by dynamite"
home dynamited twice, with home and
owner's shop destroyed °
windows smashed, intimidation, bombs, 100
demonstrators
t e
LOS ANGELES 5 black families forced from homes, cross
burnings; crosses burned on lawns of Blacks'
homes; 40
1942 DETROIT mob of 700, riot over housing, throwing
rocks"G4
Los ANGELES harassment 45
1943 DETROIT integration of emergency housing - leads to
riot - many deaths, George Scheremer of
Interracial Committee catalogs scores of
incidents of retaliation"




1944 ATLANTA home bombing; (two houses damaged)4'
BIRMINGHAM more than 20 bombings in decade and half
following war '
1944 CHICAGO house destroyed by arson; four attacks on
homes in three months; house firebombed,
two children killed; house stench-bombed 410
1945 CHICAGO attempted arson, followed by razing of house;
several bombings in five month period'
c. 1945 DETROIT house stoned by mob of more than 1,000
whites'
" ' -
1945 LOSANGELES threats, burning, death of family (husband,
wife, young children)'''
1945 MIAMI cross
1946 ATIANA next two decades - 30 home bombings ,
:"' See id. at 59.
AM See id. at. 6 1.
.1(0See id. at. 61-62.
'5. See id. at. 58-62.
,103 See id. at. 76.
401 See id. at 69.
405 See id. at. 76.
'1W See id. at. 91.
107 See id. at 76.
"08 See id. at. 10 1.
'5. See id. at 105.
See id. at 89.
See id. at 89.
.112 See id. at 92.
"3 See id. at 77.
11 See id. at 124.
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home bombed by Colunbiatisla
CHICAGO violence in housing projects, race riot, 5000
person demlonstration against imtcgration
Molotov cocktail campaign; 27 bombings"
8
1946 CHICAGO windows smashed, cars tipped over at public
housing development
' ""
1947 ATLANTA series of apparent Klan botnlbigs, two fires,
and failed pipe bonb"'
1947 BIRMINGHAM dynantite destroys home''
1948 ATLANTA house set on fire by four white youths!
'
home lbonbed .' '>+
1948 BIRMINGHAM bombing, dynamited 
house' 2'
LoSANGELES Nat King Cole has "nigger" burned into
lawn 'I 
,
1949 BIRMINGHAM three houses dynamited; bomb threat 
:
L-
CHICAGO mob violence, 800 demonstrators in front of a
home for 3 (lays - stoned, smtashed windows,
and set fire'-
Los ANGELES mob threatened
-
1949 RIc!HMOND cross burned on lawn, bricks and pellets fired
at house, threatening letters (including a
bullet)' l'
1949-1951 CHICAGO 3 bombings, ten incidents of arson, I I
attenLpted arsons, 81 other incidents of
terrorism or intimidationii1
1950s BIRMINGHAM several bombings, ripping off porch,
destroying half finished house, destroying
home, several bomb threats""
1950-1951 ATLANTA home bombings-
-
1951 CICERO destroyed furniture, firebombed apartment
building 3 (Chicago suburb)
415 See id. at 104.
416 See id. at 101.
417 See id. at 90.
411 See id. at 89.
419 See id. at 90.
420 See id. at 102.
'-" See id. at 106-07.
See id. at 103.
c 1d.
4 See id. at 107.
4 See id. at 95-96.
426 See id. at 107.
42 See id. at 117.
4' See id. at 126.
42 See id. at 112.
4' See id. at 118.
431 See id. at99, 110-11.
432 See id. at 104.
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1951 DALLAS eleven bombings, six firesm
1952 LOS ANGELES bombing"
1951 MIAMI unoccupied 16-unit complex bombed; four
other bombings "6
1953 CHICAGO stones thrown, pistols fired at night, aerial
bombs propelled at apartment"3
1953 COMPTON, CA white man beaten for selling to blacks, black
man's home flooded after 3 years, dozens of
incidents over haousing including 6
bombings'-"
1954 ATLANTA house bombing'"
1954 DETROIT 15 incidents investigated; 19 other incidents
(1953-1955)'40
1955 DETROIT two episodes - 2000 demonstrators and
several other nights of protests""
1956 ATLANTA home bombings""'
1957 PHILADELPHIA Levittown terrorizing - taunting, smashing
windows, throwing stones (veteran's home),
protests against black families for over a week,
cross burning "
1957 SAN FRANCISCO front window smashed with a rock""
c. 1958-1959 LoSANGELESAREA $10,000 worth of damage to home, more than
two dozen cross burnings 
5
13 See id. at 118-19.
"' See id. at 112.
". See id. at 127.
":3; See id. at 125.
137 See id. at 119-120.
"38 See id. at 128.
T'.' See id. at 104.
110 See id. at 122.
Id.
12 See id. at 104.
'13 See id. at 148.
+"1 See id. at 131.
-1, See id. at 129.
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APPENDIX B
HOUSING-RELATED CRIMES COMMITTED BY WHITES AGAINST BLACK
ENTRANTS, THROUGH THE 1960's
Sources other than: STEPHEN GRANT MEYER, AS LONG As THEY DON'T MOVE
NEXT DOOR
1830s-BOSTON-whites threatened to demolish home of Blacks moving into area
46
1897-CHICAGO-property owners "declared war" on Black neighbors447
1911-KANSAS CrIY-five incidents of homes dynamited 44




1918-CHICAGO-first Black family in neighborhood bombed twice4'
1919-CHICAGO-Black family threatened with public flogging and arsonI
S2
1919-CHICAGO--13 bombings in pre-riot 19194'
1919-CHICAGO-7 explosions in 6 weeks preceding the riot
4 4
1919-CHICAGO-homes of 9 families vandalized and nearly destroyed
45
1919--CHICAGO-home of Dr. PercyJulian bombed and burned twice 456




1920s-ATLANTA--Klan burned crosses and threatened violence to Black homes4 9
446 SUSAN WELCH ET AL., RACE & PLACE: RACE RELATIONS IN AN AMRIcAN CITY (2001),
20.
447 WniLAM TUTrLE, RACE RIOT 161 (1985).
448 HERBERT SHAPIRO, WHITE VIOLENCE AND BLACK RESPONSE 143 (1988).
441 See supra note 447, at 1594
10 URBAN POLICY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURYAMERICA 76 (Arnold R. Hirsch & Raymond
A. Mohl eds., 1993).
... DEMpSEYJ. TRAVIS, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BLACK CHICAGO 15 (1982).
411 See supra note 451, at 25.
'53 See supra note 447, at 159.
4' Id. at 182.
411 Id. at 54-55.
46 ARNOLD R. HIRSCH, MAKING THE SECOND GHETTO: RACE AND HOUSING IN CHICAGO
1940-1960 63 (1998).
451 See supra note 447, at 61-62.
411 See supra note 448, at 175.
4" KEVIN MICHAEL KRUSE, WHITE FLIGHT: RESISTANCE TO DESEGREGATION OF
NEIGHBORHOODS, SCHOOLS, AND BUSINESSES IN ATLANTA, 1946-1966 38 (Ph.D. Disserta-
tion, Cornell University 2000).
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1925-DETROIT-mob gathered and stoned a house' 60
1932-1935-ATLANTA-whites burned houses under construction and bombed new
homes 6!
1937-CHICAGO-mobs threw missiles, spat at, cursed, and beat a Black family
4 62
1942-DETROIT-riot, 40 injured, 220 arrested, 109 held for trial
4 6
1944-1946---CHICAGO-46 homes assaulted with 3 people killed'6
1945-1946-DETROIT-countless woman callers harassed a white owner who sold to
Blacks
45
1945-1946--DETROIT-porch torn off by truck and cables'6
1945-1946-ATANTA-several violent clashes4 '
1946-ATLANTA-several incidents of shooting and stoning of homes4
4691946-ATLANTA- family bombed by a passing car
1946-CHICAGO-mob of 1500-3000 battled police and destroyed property
4 70
1946-CHICAGO-mob burned garage and stoned a house4
7'
1946-ATLANTA-young Black man blackjacked by a gang of the Columbians4
1946-ATLANTA-Columbians peppered homes with stones and shots in a transitional
neighborhood 
4 7
1946-ATLANTA-Black home at the edge of a white neighborhood was bombed
74
1946-ATLANTA-Columbian mob vociferously threatened 'a Black family moving into
its home 75
1947-ATLANTA-whites shot a new Black home with a shotgun and threw a brick
through the window 76
461 Seesupra note 448, at 186."" See supra note 459, at 6.
461 WENDY PLOTKIN, DEEDS OF MISTRUST: RACE, HOUSING, AND RESTRICTIVE
COVENANTS IN CHICAGO, 1900-1953 (1999) 177 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Uni-
versity of Illinois at Chicago) (on file with authors).
463 THOMAS J. SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE AND INEQUALITY IN
POST-WAR DETROIT 74 (1996).
464 See supra note 451, at 84.
465 See supra note 463, at 250.
Id. at 253.
467 See supra note 459, at 17.
46 See supra note 448, at 374.
469 Id. at 374.
170 Id. at 376.
471 See supra note 448, at 377.
472 See supra note 459, at 30.
171 Id. at 31.
474 Id
471 Id. at 32.
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1947-CHICAGO-mob up to 5000 beat people and destroyed property
4 77
1947-DETROIT-windows broken and small fires set478
1947-CHICAGO-garage of Black family burned
47
"
1947-ATLANTA Klan members whipped a Black man and tore the windows from his
house80
1947-ATLANTA-white man bombed a Black's house and got into a gunfight with
him
481
1948-DETROIT-threats to burn down new homes for Blacks
42
1948-DETROIT-death threats to real estate agent selling to Blacks
83
1948-CHICAGO-five arson attacks on homes of Blacks, monthly 484
1948-1952-DETROIT-demonstrators vandalized new homes, including arson485
1949-CHICAGO-a home burned, cross burned, and windows smashed
486
1949-CHICAGO--mob of 10,000 beat passersby
487
1949-CHICAGO-mob threw gasoline-soaked rags into a home488
1949-ATLANTA-Black families moving got repeated threatens until one of their
homes was bombed
4 9
1950-DETROIT-home stoned, car tires slashed, cross burned 490
1951-CICERO-police failed to protect a family from attack49" '
1953-ATLANTA-Black home burned twice and then dynamited
49
1
1954-CLEVELAND-home of local Black attorney bombed499
476 Id. at 7.
477 See supra note 448, at 376.
'7 See supra note 463, at 242.
479 See supra note 451, at 76.
411 See supra note 459, at 50.
481 Id. at 50.
412 See supra note 463, at 248.
482 Id. at 248.
411 MONTHLY REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE COMMISSION ON HuMAN
RELATIONS 8 (AUGUST 1948).
'5 See supra note 463, at 388.
486 See supra note 451, at 125.
417 See supra note 448, at 376.
4I id. at 377.
4"9 See supra note 459, at 66.
490 See supra note 463, at 241.
"' CENTER FOR URBAN AFFAIRS, NORTHWESTERN UNiVERSITY, MEETING ON SUBURBAN
DISCRIMINATORY HOUSING PRAcncES 54 (JUNE 26, 1978).
492 See supra note 459, at 114.
113 W. DENNIS KEATING, THE SUBURBAN RACIAL DILEMMA: HOUSING AND
NEIGHBORHOODS 98 (1994).
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1955-ATLANTA-dynamite blasted the porch off a new Black home4 94
1955-DETROIT-1000 person mob stoned a house, injured 2 policemen4 95
1955-DETROIT-rumors of racially motivated violence in changing neighborhoods4 96
1956-ATLANTA-home bombed on Baker Avenue
497
1956-DETROIT-two-week long siege against a Black family498
1956-ATLANTA-two sticks of dynamite blew up the cellar of a home recently bought
by Blacks 4"
1956-ATLANTA-bomb bounced off a Black home, blowing a hole in the street 00
1963-DETROIT-teens led mobs of stone throwers 0'
1957-ATLANTA-whites burned a home while other whites were trying to buy it from
its Black owner..
1960-ATLANTA-Black home next to a white school was dynamited
5 3
1960-ATLANTA-Black home burned before the owners could move 
in 504
1960-ATLANTA-mob threatened a Black family moving into its home, threw a rock
through the windows50
1964-CHICAGO-mob vandalized apartment of Black students while they were at
school
50 6
1965-DETROIT-teens threw firecrackers at a Black woman and hurled stones and
mud at her house
50 7
1965-DETROIT-25 crosses burned throughout the city 08
1969-VALPARAISO-repeated death threats over the phone' 89
1969-VALPARAISO-threatening phone calls and mail every day for a year"1
... See supra note 459, at 164.
... See supra note 463, at 240.
496 Id. at 231.
497 See supra note 459, at 196.
4' See supra note 463, at 235.
49 Id. at 235.
500 See supra note 459, at 197.
501 See supra note 463, at 254.
502 See supra note 459, at 155.
"" Id. at 159.
... Id. at 169.
"o5 Id. at 169.
106 MIKE ROYKO, Boss: RIcHARDJ. DALEY 131 (1971).
507 See supra note 463, at 254.
'9' Id. at 265.
509 JOHN GEHM, BRINGING IT HOME 156 (1984).
",o See supra note 65, at 160.
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1969-VALPARAMSO-trespasser tried to break in until seen through a window11
511 See supra note 65, at 183.
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APPENDIX C
ARRESTS AND CHARGES, INTEGRATION OF TRUMBALL PARK HOMES
PUBLIC HOUSING DEVELOPMENT CHICAGO, 1953-1955
Source: Chicago Commission on Human Relations, The Trumball Park
Homes Disturbances. A Chronological Report,
August 4, 1953 to June 30, 1955
Charge Number of Arrests
Disorderly Conduct 164
Resisting a Police Officer 8
Discharging a Firearm 5
Refusal to Obey a Police Officer 1
Traffic Violation 8
Carrying Dangerous Weapons 1
Possession of Fireworks 6
Dumping on Public Way 1
Offensive Bombs in Public Places 1
Depositing Stink Bomb (S) 1
Possession of Stink Bomb (S) 1
Destruction of Property by Explosives (S) * 1
Riot (S) 25
Destruction of Building (S) 2
Assault with a Deadly Weapon (S) 3
Possession of a Deadly Weapon (S) 2
Unlawful Assembly (S) 43
Refusal to Disperse (S) 4
Aggravated Assault and Battery (S) 1
Aggravated Assault (S) 1
Possession of Explosives (S) 1
Conspiracy to Do an Illegal Act (S) 2
Intimidation by Combination (S) 1
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Carrying Concealed Firearms (S) 2
Possession of Fireworks (S) 7
Disorderly Conduct (S) 1
Assault and Battery (S) 3
Not Reported 4
Total Number of Arrests 300
(S) indicates state charges. Others are local.
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APPENDIX D
DISPOSITION OF CHARGES, INTEGRATION OF TRUMBALL PARK HOMES
PUBLIC HOUSING DEVELOPMENT CHICAGO, 1953-1955
Source: Chicago Commission on Human Relations, The Trumball Park
Homes Disturbances. A Chronological Report,
August 4, 1953 toJune 30, 1955
Disposition Number of Such Dispositions
Fine 139
Costs 109
Incarceration 1 - (ten days House of Corrections)
Supervision 9
Discharged 85
Dismissed for Want of Prose- 2
cution
Not Reported 16
Other 34
